UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME

Terminal Evaluation of UNDP/GEF project 5332

"Supporting rural community adaptation to climate change in mountainous regions of Djibouti"

Evaluation report

Dr Marie-Ange Baudoin, Pierre Bégat
Evaluation timeframe: November 2019 – February 2020
Report submitted in February 2020

Terminal evaluation report for the UNDP/GEF "Supporting rural community adaptation to climate change in mountainous regions of Djibouti"
GEF Project ID: 5332
GEF Agency Project ID: 5189
Evaluation timeframe: November 2019 – February 2020
Report submitted in February 2020
Country included in the project: Djibouti
GEF Fund: Least Developed Countries Fund
GEF Focal Area: Climate change
Executing Partner: Ministry of Habitat, Urbanism and the Environment
Evaluation team members: Dr Marie-Ange Baudoin (lead), Pierre Bégat

Acknowledgments

The evaluation team wishes to thank the project team, especially the Project Manager, Aïcha AHMED, the Project Assistant, Hamad HOUMED and UNDP Djibouti Climate change/environment Junior Expert, Hibo MOHAMED, who facilitated the evaluation process – in particular during the in-country mission. The evaluation team was well received by institutional partners, in particular UNDP Djibouti Country Office, the Ministry of Habitat, Urbanism and the Environment, and beneficiary communities.

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I. ACRONYMS

AWS	Automatic Weather Station
CCA	Climate change adaptation
CERD	Djibouti Studies and Research Center (Centre d'Etudes et de Recherche de Djibouti)
CMC	Catchment Management Committee
CO	Country Office
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CPAP	Country Programme Action Plan
CPD	Country Programme Document
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CTA	Chief Technical Advisor
DAF	Development Assistance Framework
DEDD	Direction of Environment and Sustainable Development (Direction de l'Environnement et du Développement Durable)
DRM	Disaster risk management
DRR	Disaster risk reduction
EA	Executing Agency
EAC	East African Community
ESS	Environmental & Social Safeguards
EVA	Environnement Village Adailou
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FP	Focal point
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GEF	Global Environment Facility
GPAA	Rural Agricultural Association of Assamo (Groupement Paysan Agricole Assamo)
HH	Household
HYCOS	Hydrological Cycle Observing System
IA	Implementing Agency
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
JICA	Japanese International Cooperation Agency
LRCMC	Local Risk and Catastrophe Management Committee
M&E	Monitoring & Evaluation
MAEPERH	Ministry of Agriculture, Water, Fisheries and Livestock Farming (Ministère de l'Agriculture, de l'Elevage, de la Pêche et des Ressources Halieutiques)
MESR	Ministry of Higher Education and Research (Ministère de l'Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche)
MHUE	Ministry of Habitat, Urbanism and the Environment
MTE	Midterm evaluation
MUET	Ministry of Urbanism, Environment and Tourism
NCCC	National Climate Change Committee
NCCS	National Climate Change Strategy
NECCF	National Environment and Climate Change Fund
NGO	Non-governmental organisation

NIM	National Implementation Modality
NMA	National Meteorological Agency
NPC	National Procurement Commission
ONEAD	National Water and Sanitation Agency (Office National de l'Eau et de l'Assainissement Djibouti
PIF	Project Information Form
PIR	Project Interim Report
PMU	Project Management Unit
PMU	Project Manager
PPG	Project Preparation Grant
PRODERMO	Rural Community Development and Water Mobilisation Project (Projet de développement rural communautaire et de mobilisation des eaux)
PSC	Project Steering Committee
PSPP	Supporting Horn of Africa's Resilience – Securing Pastoral Systems in Djibouti (Projet de Sécurisation des Systèmes Pastoraux)
RBF	Results-based framework
RTA	Regional Technical Advisor
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SMART	Specific, Manageable, Agreeable, Realistic, Time-Bound
TE	Terminal Evaluation
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. Project summary table

<table>
<tr><td colspan="3">Project title: Supporting rural community adaptation to climate change in mountainous regions of Djibouti</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">GEF Project ID (PMIS #): 5189</td><td>UNDP approval date: 07/25/2014</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Country: Djibouti</td><td>GEF approval date: 08/04/2014</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Region: Africa</td><td>Date of first disbursement: October 2015</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Focal Area: Climate change</td><td>Midterm Evaluation completion date: September 2018</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">GEF Focal Area Strategic Objective:
CCA-1 Outcome 1.1: Mainstreamed adaptation in broader development frameworks at country level and in targeted vulnerable areas
CCA-2 Outcome 2.2: Strengthened adaptive capacity to reduce risks to climate-induced economic losses</td><td>Planned duration: 4 years</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Trust Fund: GEF LDCF</td><td>Completion date: February 2019</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Executing Agency/ Implementing Partner: Ministry of Habitat, Urbanism and the Environment</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">Other execution partners: Ministry of Agriculture, Water, Fisheries and Livestock Farming, Ministry of Higher Education and Research, association Environnement Village Adailou (EVA), cooperative Groupement Paysan Agricole Assamo</td></tr>
<tr><td>Project Financing</td><td>Total costs GEF:
USD 5,379,452</td><td>Disbursed (USD, as of January 2020):
USD 5,350,757</td></tr>
</table>

B. Project description

The evaluated project, the operational execution of which officially terminated on 31 December 2019, was designed to reduce the vulnerability of rural populations in mountainous areas of Djibouti to repeated water shortages. Such shortages have been increasingly frequent, culminating with four consecutive years of failed rainfall between 2008 and 2011 that depleted up to 80% of communal wells across the country.

Due to the lack of water, farmers and pastoralists are experiencing a severe drop in agricultural and livestock production and a deterioration of their incomes. Food security is threatened, with up to 49% of the population deemed “moderately insecure” in terms of food security in 2013. Lack of water has already forced nomadic pastoralists to reside longer at sites near groundwater boreholes. Consequently, there has been intense pressure on existing water points and significant land and forest degradation as well as loss of vegetation due to overgrazing. Mountainous populations are particularly vulnerable to climate-induced water stresses. This is because remote mountainous communities lack livelihood alternatives and turn to the overexploitation of natural resources when livestock and rain-fed agriculture cannot sustain their needs.

Exacerbating the poverty and climate-related problems in the mountain regions is the limited availability of funds at the national level to support adaptation actions. This lack of funds adds to inadequate governance structures to plan for long term adaptation at the national level.

Faced this baseline situation, the project sought to intervene in two areas, namely Adailou (Tadjourah region) and Assamo (Ali Sabieh region), through three components:

- Component 1: Increased incorporation of climate change adaptation and adaptation finance in climate-resilient development planning at the national level

- Associated outcome: Institutional capacities for coordinated, climate-resilient planning strengthened. Mechanisms and a de-risked investment environment established to catalyse finance for climate change adaptation.

- Component 2: Reduced vulnerability to climate change for vulnerable communities in two targeted mountain regions (Adailou and Assamo)
  - Associated outcome: Improved water management in the targeted regions to conserve scarce water resources and manage temporal flows to reduce flooding and erosion.
- Component 3: Enhanced human and institutional capacity for increased sustainable rural livelihoods among vulnerable communities in two targeted regions (Adailou and Assamo)
  - Associated outcome: Improved resilience to hydrological climate change risks. Enhanced resilience to climate-mediated economic shocks through income generation and diversification.

The two rural mountain areas targeted by this initiative (Adailou and Assamo) were selected for their vulnerability and absence of other major alternative livelihood options (such as industry or mining).

C. Evaluation rating table

The following ratings have been given by the evaluation team.

Table 1. Summary of evaluation ratings.

Evaluation Ratings:			
1. Monitoring and Evaluation	***rating***	**2. IA& EA Execution**	***rating***
M&E design at entry	Satisfactory	Quality of UNDP Implementation	Satisfactory
M&E Plan Implementation	Moderately satisfactory	Quality of Execution - Executing Agency	Moderately satisfactory
Overall quality of M&E	Moderately satisfactory	Overall quality of Implementation / Execution	Moderately satisfactory
3. Assessment of Outcomes	**rating**	**4. Sustainability**	**rating**
Relevance	Relevant	Financial resources:	Moderately unlikely
Effectiveness	Moderately satisfactory	Socio-political:	Moderately likely
Efficiency	Moderately unsatisfactory	Institutional framework and governance:	Moderately likely
Overall Project Outcome Rating	Moderately satisfactory	Environmental:	Moderately likely
		Overall likelihood of sustainability:	Moderately likely

D. Summary of conclusions, recommendations and lessons learned

Despite an original design that was generally sound and significant achievement towards its overarching objective to reduce the climate vulnerability of rural communities in mountainous regions of Djibouti, the project suffered from a number of shortcomings that reduce its current and future impacts. These are: i) i) the non-implementation of 18% of the project planned activities/ sub-activities[1] ; ii) insufficient investment in M&E, which did not allow for relevant revisions of the results-based framework; and iii) execution difficulties in terms of procurement and supervision of construction activities.

[1] The calculation is based on the 60 activities and 12 sub-activities indicated in Annexe 2 of the Prodoc: Workplan; out of which 13 were not implemented at all (see p.40).

Table 2. Key recommendations from the project terminal evaluation.

Actions to follow up or reinforce initial benefits from the project[2]		
Recommendation	Responsible unit	Timeframe
1. The handover of a number of infrastructures needs to be organised with the relevant institutions, not only to respect national procedures, but also to ensure the maintenance of these infrastructures: Adailou borehole, Adailou nursery, automatic weather stations, educative garden, gabion workshops.	DEDD and relevant sectoral institutions and organisations, including the National Meteorology Agency, Direction de l'Eau, EVA, Agricultural Cooperative of Assamo	As soon as possible.
2. As operational implementation of the project officially terminated, supervision of remaining on-the-ground activities needs to be organised between DEDD and UNDP. Activities include: i) completion of the educative garden; and ii) connection of the Adailou borehole to standposts.	DEDD & UNDP	As soon as possible.
3. Some infrastructures and equipment are already damaged and require maintenance, namely AWSs in Adailou and Assamo, and cisterns in the Dora area. Other infrastructures are threatened and need to be elevated and/or strengthened before they become out-of-repair. These include: i) the micro-dam in Assamo and the well upstream; and ii) the gabion wall protecting market garden in Adailou. Ideally, additional training could be given to local communities so that they can organise themselves and repair these infrastructures.	DEDD, Direction de l'Eau, EVA, Agricultural Cooperative of Assamo	As soon as possible.
4. In terms of governance, strengthening the technical capacity and streamlining the agenda of the NCCC will allow to strengthen the NCCC's workstream.	DEDD, NCCC	Whenever the workplan of the NCCC is revised and approved.
Proposals for future directions underlining main objectives		
Recommendation	Responsible unit	Timeframe

[2] The template for the TE report presented in the ToRs included a section "Corrective actions for the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the project", which applies to MTEs, and, by definition, not to TEs.

5. Limiting site dispersion to facilitate project execution	Future project designers, DEDD, UNDP, other GEF agencies	During the site selection phase of future project designs.
6. In the context of the national devolution policy, involvement of regional authorities would need to be strengthened. In this respect, sending out invitations to PSC meetings is not quite sufficient, as regional representatives typically receive many such invitations and cannot honour them all. An alternative solution could be the dissemination of a short, illustrated quarterly newsletter documenting project progress, along with systematic courtesy visits when the project team is on site.	Execution teams of future projects, regional authorities	During the execution phase of future projects.
7. The assessment[3] produced in January 2017 on damages to the water protection infrastructures in Adailou contains valuable information on best practices for the design and construction of such infrastructures. This document should serve a basis for the development of updated national guidelines for the design and construction of water protection infrastructures, that will benefit many other present and future initiatives.	DEDD, Direction de l'Eau, UNDP	During the design phase of water protection infrastructures.

Best and worst practices in addressing issues relating to relevance, performance and success

- In terms of execution, the evaluators noted that 18% of the activities/ sub-activities included in the project document were not implemented and a new activity was added (see Section B, p. 40). As a result, Outputs 2.3 and 3.2 were not delivered, and the overall impact of the project in terms of resilience strengthening of vulnerable communities will be inferior to what could be expected.
- With this regards, it is recommended as best practice to keep written statements of all changes made in the project framework and activities: written statements – like minutes of steering committees – should be kept by the project team, provide clear explaination of the changes made in the project, and of the validation process during the steering committees.
- Climate change absolutely needs to be taken into account when designing protection infrastructure. In this perspective, the IGAD/ICPAC study on downscaled climate change

[3] Compagnie D'Aménagement des Coteaux de Gascogne. January 2017. Bassin versant de l'oued de Weima. Diagnostic hydraulique et structurel des sites d'Adaylou, Abahloïta et Guemellou

projections conducted in 2018 for this project should inform the design of future infrastructures[4].

- Partnerships with Civil Society Organisations were a significant innovation by the project, and should be continued in future projects. To enhance the effectiveness of these partnerships, capacity-building efforts could be made to ensure that prospective civil society partners have a clear understanding of roles, responsibilities and procurement processes.
- Establishing strong partnership with relevant institutions from project onset is necessary to ensure ownership of project activities by the appropriate institutions at project end.
- The DEDD adequately organises field visits for prospective construction work bidders, so that the actual conditions of the work (including transportation costs of equipment and material) can be reflected in their offers. All efforts should be made to encourage prospective bidders to participate to these field visits; this is all the more important to ensure delivery quality in remote project sites.
- Hiring an expert to support the PMU, or a pool of experts with knowledge in project management and reporting processes (national or international expert), would be useful for technical backstopping, quality control of project deliverables and M&E.

[4] H.S. Endris. 2018. Downscaling Coarse Resolution Climate Projections for Djibouti.

III. INTRODUCTION

A. Purpose of the evaluation

The overall objective of this TE is to "assess the achievement of project results, and to draw lessons that can both improve the sustainability of benefits from this project, and aid in the overall enhancement of UNDP programming".

This is achieved by assessing the following:

- What is the progress towards the project's stated outputs and outcomes, as defined in the Results Framework?
- What was the effectiveness of partner and stakeholder collaboration and coordination?
- To what extent have the Results Framework indicators contributed to the management of the project by enabling the project team to adapt management and implementation strategies as required?
- How effective have UNDP and the MHUE's leadership capacity and partnership been in providing support and guidance to achieve the project's main objective?
- What is the operating effectiveness and efficiency of the project?
- What are the major challenges that the project faced so far, and how were they/can they be addressed?
- What are key lessons learned from the project for future relevant initiatives?

B. Scope and methodology

Below is a summary of the evaluation methodology.

1. Review relevant literature and documentation to assess how correct the project rational has been over time.
2. Review the project's indicators and end of project targets and assess how correct the assumptions made in the Project Document have been over time. If necessary, suggest changes to project's indicators and targets.
3. Conduct a review of the projects stated outputs and outcomes as defined in the Results Framework using the documentation supplied by UNDP, as well as interviews and focus group discussions with relevant project partners and beneficiaries.
4. Conduct an analysis of financial and programme management to measure the success of achieving the project outcomes.
5. Provide recommendations for operating effectiveness and efficiency based on evidence from the above.

The evaluation focuses on four key focal areas, namely:

1. **Relevance** – did this project target the priorities of its beneficiaries as defined in the initial capacity assessments or scoping phase? If so, how much progress has been made since the project initiation?
2. **Effectiveness** – are the planned objectives, results and activities of the project achieved? If so, what are the successful methods that are contributing to this success? If not, what are the challenges that are preventing this? Do those problems still exist and how can they be overcome during future initiatives?
3. **Efficiency** – were inputs (resources and time) used in the best possible way to achieve the objectives of the project? If so, how was this efficiency achieved? If not, what were the reasons for this inefficiency? What could be done to improve efficiency? How can further efficiencies be achieved in future initiatives?

4. **Sustainability** – are the project objectives likely to be sustained beyond the scope of this funded project? Will lessons learned be taken up by countries when financial assistance is no longer available? Is the stakeholder ownership strong enough to be sustained beyond the scope of this project? Has the project developed sufficient institutional capacity (systems, structures, expertise) that will be self-sufficient after the project closure?
5. **Impact** – are there indications that the project has contributed to, or enabled progress toward, reduced environmental stress and/or improved ecological status?

More specific, indicative questions for each of these categories are presented in Annex 6. The rating scales used are presented in Annex 1.D.

Data collection & analysis

The primary emphasis of the evaluation is based on evidence provided by UNDP regarding documentation, reports and media developed. Interviews were conducted with representatives of UNDP in Djibouti as well as partner organisations and project beneficiaries. In addition, visits in the target regions were organised (see Annex 2 for an agenda of the in-country mission), with support from the UNDP project team. Qualitative and quantitative data received from the literature review, the interviews (including focus group discussions, as required) and observations on project sites are presented in tables and graphs, where possible, and carefully synthesised and analysed. Quantitative information generated was triangulated to check/ensure that information generated is consistent and complete. Qualitative information generated at various levels is thematically organised and carefully narrated. Results from the data analysis are used to develop balanced recommendations for future initiatives.

Ethics

Throughout the evaluation process, the evaluators abided strictly by the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) "Ethical Guidelines for Evaluations"[5]. In particular, the evaluation team was extremely careful to report impartial analyses, and maintain an independent judgement on the various evaluation criteria. All efforts were exerted to elicit and duly take into account reviews on the draft versions of this report from various parties, including the UNDP national office, the UNDP regional office and the DEDD. For the sake of transparency, any comments from these reviewers not fully taken into account by the evaluators because of diverging views have been reflected in Annex 10, along with evaluators' responses to these comments.

To the extent possible, the evaluators strived to consult as vast a range of stakeholders as possible, to ensure that views from all interested parties could be recorded. This includes all available public institutions, consultants, contractors and community members – including women and youths. Information obtained through interviews was systematically anonymised.

Limits of the terminal evaluation

The TE faced several challenges and limits, as described below.

- In general, it is best pactice to start the operational phase of terminal evaluations four to five months before the closure of the project and the dissolution of the PMU, with a view to facilitate the evaluation process. In the present case, the in-country mission was conducted after the PMU was dissolved. Despite the willingness of the former PMU members to facilitate the task of the

[5] Available at: http://www.unevaluation.org/document/detail/100

evaluators, the level of mobilisation was not what it could have been if the TE had been conducted earlier.

- Another consequence of the belated TE process is that time available to conduct the mission was limited to one week, which was challenging given the distance between project sites. However, most planned visits could be conducted and most relevant partners were interviewed.
- Related to the first above, local communities in the Adailou and Assamo areas had not been informed of the mission, which limited the number of interactions that the evaluators could provoke. Similarly, regional authorities in Tadjourah (prefecture and regional council) were not available for interviews.
- In the Adailou area, recent rainfall had rendered access to some of the infrastructures difficult. For example, the evaluators could not visit some of the wells north of Guirrori.
- Some important documents were not available for the evaluators to consult, as they were not finalised at the time of the evaluation. These include the final audit and the end-of-project report.
- Because of an outbreak of chikungunya fever at the time of the evaluation mission, the PM could not accompany the evaluators to the sites, and the CERD[6] focal point was unavailable.

C. Structure of the evaluation report

The evaluation report consists of the following:

- an **executive summary** providing a brief overview of the main conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation;
- an **introduction** providing the purpose and objectives, expected outputs and methodology of the evaluation;
- a brief **overview of the evaluated project**, its development context, the problems that the project sought to address, the project objective and status of activities, project implementation arrangements and key project partners and stakeholders;
- evaluation **findings** on project strategy, progress towards results, project implementation, adaptive management and project sustainability;
- evaluation **conclusions** on the design, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of the project, lessons learned and proposals for future directions; and
- **annexes** including terms of reference, itinerary for the in-country mission, list of persons interviewed, summary of field visits, list of documents reviewed, evaluation question matrix, questionnaire used and summary of results, and signed evaluation consultant agreement form.

[6] Djibouti Studies and Research Center (Centre d'Etudes et de Recherche de Djibouti)

IV. PROJECT DESCRIPTION AND DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

A. Project start and duration

The project officially started on 10 February 2015, and was intended to last four years. A no-cost extension was granted, and the project is now due for completion by February 2020. Financial closure intervened on 31 December 2019.

B. Problems that the project sought to address

The main adaptation challenge that the project sought to address is the vulnerability of rural populations in mountainous areas of Djibouti to repeated water shortages. Such shortages have been increasingly frequent, culminating with four consecutive years of failed rainfall between 2008 and 2011 that depleted up to 80% of communal wells across the country.

Due to the lack of water, farmers and pastoralists are experiencing a severe drop in agricultural and livestock production and a deterioration of their incomes. Food security is threatened, with up to 49% of the population deemed "moderately insecure"[7] in terms of food security in 2013. Lack of water has already forced nomadic pastoralists to reside longer at sites near groundwater boreholes. Consequently, there has been intense pressure on existing water points and significant land and forest degradation as well as loss of vegetation due to overgrazing.

Mountainous populations are particularly vulnerable to climate-induced water stresses. This is because remote mountainous communities lack livelihood alternatives and turn to the overexploitation of natural resources when livestock and rain-fed agriculture cannot sustain their needs. As a result, habitat degradation – especially of the tree cover – is severe in these areas, leading in turn to increased erosion from runoff, limited water retention capacity of soils and increased vulnerability to flash floods. Agro-pastoralists are not familiar with technologies that could help increase productivity and build their resilience to climate change (e.g. using rainwater harvesting to mitigate the impacts of drought).

Early warning systems are not adequate to mitigate the impacts of extreme weather events. Few drought and flood warnings are communicated to rural populations, and information on best practices for water management is not effectively relayed to rural communities. The situation is particularly severe for rural mountain populations, since no hydro-meteorological stations exist to assist in generating weather warnings.

Finally, exacerbating the poverty and climate-related problems in the mountain regions is the limited availability of funds at the national level to support adaptation actions. This lack of funds adds to inadequate governance structures to plan for long term adaptation at the national level.

C. Immediate and development objectives of the project

The overall objective of the project is to "reduce climate-related vulnerabilities facing the inhabitants of mountainous regions of Djibouti through institutional strengthening, climate-smart water management and targeted investment".

Associated development objectives, as reflected in the project's results framework, are to:

- improve sustainable access to water to rural communities in mountainous regions;

[7] Source: World Food Programme, quoted in the project document.

- protect local communities against floods and generally increase disaster risk preparedness; and
- support and diversify rural livelihood options in selected areas.

D. Baseline indicators established

The Results-based framework includes a number of indicators and targets, against which the results of the project are assessed. These indicators and targets are presented in Table 3 below.

Table 3. Indicators, baseline and end-of-project targets.

	Indicators	Baseline	End-of-project targets
Project objective: Reduction of climate-related vulnerabilities facing the inhabitants of mountainous regions of Djibouti through institutional strengthening, climate-smart water management and targeted investment	1. Number of households (HH) with enhanced livelihoods through access to water, improved ecosystem services and reforestation	All target farmers and pastoralists require strengthened livelihoods to become less vulnerable to climate shocks. Livelihoods need to be strengthened by mobilizing water with physical infrastructure for use during the dry season (e.g., earth dams and retention basins, boreholes, etc.). Also, livelihoods need to be strengthened with reforestation/afforestation and sustainable land use practices. Farmers and pastoralists need to be provided technical and applied knowledge on soil and water conservation methods and other sustainable practices to ensure that they can continually make use of productive ecosystem services.	2000 HHs have enhanced livelihoods due to water mobilisation and reforestation
	2. Reactivation of the National Climate Change Committee (NCCC) to coordinate climate change and resilience-building projects / activities.	The former National Climate Change Committee has effectively ceased to exist.	Reactivation of the National Climate Change Committee (NCCC) with a clear mandate and a technically-capable Secretariat to support Climate Change adaptation interventions. The NCCC will be authorised to have the power of a Government Permanent Secretariat and the Ministry of the Environment (MHUE) will be officially designated as the house for the Secretariat.
Outcome 1: • institutional capacities for coordinated, climate-resilient planning strengthened	1. Development of a National Climate Change Strategy to guide the NCCC on appropriate coordination mechanisms and diversified, financing strategies to support adaptation-related activities in the long-term.	A National Climate Change Strategy does not exist in Djibouti.	Creation of a National Climate Change Strategy informed by dynamic modelling results which guides the NCCC's work and provides strategic

• mechanisms and a de-risked investment environment established to catalyse finance for climate change adaptation			coherence to climate change adaptation initiatives in Djibouti.
	2. Development of a roadmap outlining how to establish and capitalise a Fund for the Environment and Climate Change.	No mechanism to attract and channel funding for medium- to long-term climate resilience-strengthening activities.	Roadmap defining how to establish and capitalise a National Environment and Climate Change Fund which supports climate-smart adaptation activities for rural and urban populations in the long-term and which supports ongoing and future climate resilience projects.
Outcome 2: Improved water management in the targeted regions (Adailou and Assamo) to conserve scarce water resources and manage temporal flows to reduce flooding and erosion	1. Number of micro-dams, cisterns, retention basins and bank fortifications built with the dual goals of reducing downstream impacts during flood events and retaining water to replenish groundwater resources.	1 borehole in each zone, 10 shallow wells in Adailou, 14 in Assamo	Design and construction of 3 micro-dams; fifteen (15) 100 m3 cisterns, where each will provide potable water to 15 families; 16 semi- underground sills (8 in Adailou and 8 in Assamo); 2,000 m3 and 4,000 m3 of bank fortifications with rock-filled wirework (i.e. gabion) in Adailou and Assamo respectively to protect wadi banks and agricultural plots from erosion.
	2. Percentage of total hectarage of agro-pastoralists' land which is irrigated by boreholes.	2 ha of agro-pastoral plots in Adailou (not irrigated) and 10 ha of agro- pastoral plots (not irrigated) in Assamo	30 hectares irrigated in Assamo and 30 hectares in Adailou.
	3.Number of hectares of land replanted and reforested in Assamo, Adailou and Ayladou to: i) regenerate dwindling species and valued pastoral species and ii) reduce erosion.	10 ha of reforestation/re-vegetation/re- seeding activities.	70 ha in Assamo and 380 hectares in Adailou replanted and reforested.

	4. Number of pastoral centres (pastoretums) in each region	No pastoretums in either region.	1 pastoretum in each region created.
	5. Number of women's tree seedling nurseries created in both Adailou and Assamo to i) produce seeds, ii) multiply species (e.g. wind-blocking plants, fruit-bearing trees, etc.), and iii) support reforestation	1 tree nursery in Assamo (0 nurseries in Adailou)	At least 1 women's tree seedling nursery created in both Adailou and Assamo.
	6. Creation of Catchment and Water Point Management Committees.	No Catchment Management or Water Point Management Committees exist in either Assamo or Adailou to enable the sustainable management of water use. Most diesel-powered wells have become non-functional due to the high price of diesel and the fact that there is no one with the ability to maintain the pumps locally.	5 Catchment Management Committees formed (4 in Adailou in the Weima watershed and 1 in Assamo, the Juba watershed) and 27 Water Point Committees formed in total (one around each water point). All Committees will have 4 people including 1 female representative.
Outcome 3: • improved resilience to hydrological climate change risks. • enhanced resilience to climate-mediated economic shocks through income generation and diversification	1. Number of Automatic Weather Stations (AWSs) procured and installed.	1 rain gauge in Adailou and 5 rain gauges in Assamo. No weather stations located in either zone.	One automatic weather station procured and installed in each region
	2. Number of community adaptation measures implemented to build drought or flood-resilience.	No community DRM/DRR adaptation preparedness plans.	One (1) community DRR/DRM adaptation measure implemented in each region (e.g. water point reinforcement with gabion, micro-dam de-silting).
	3. Number of rural inhabitants (disaggregated by gender and type of activity) who actively participate in bee-keeping, poultry raising	No community members are active in poultry breeding and bee-keeping.	70 households (HHs) active in poultry breeding in Assamo and 50 HHs in Adailou. 14 people in Adailou and 6 in Assamo active in beekeeping and which have been provided appropriate materials.

	4. Number of local market stalls rehabilitated / created to facilitate access of Adailou and Assamo farmers/cultivators/pastoralists to larger regional markets.	A market stall in Ali Sabieh exists but it needs to be rehabilitated and extended to have a permanent structure. The market stall in Tadjourah needs to be created.	Rehabilitation of the Ali-Sabieh market stall and creation of the Tadjourah market stall.
	5. % change in revenue to artisanal activities, poultry-breeding, bee-keeping and nursery sales (disaggregated by gender).	Only limited and irregular sales of guava in Assamo. No sales of products in Adailou. No participation of community members in livelihood diversification measures in either region.	% change in revenue for community members (including % increase in supply of eggs, chicken, honey, nursery seedlings and gabion) - disaggregated by gender.

E. Main stakeholders

The project is the outcome of a comprehensive national dialogue between relevant national, regional and local stakeholders, including associations and donor partners, as reflected in the prodoc (Table 7; Annex 6). In particular, during the Project Preparation Grant (PPG) phase of the project, three field consultations campaigns with local populations in Adailou and Assamo were conducted.

This project is executed under the National Implementation Modality (NIM). The executing entity/implementing partner for this project is the Ministry of Habitat, Urbanism and the Environment (MHUE) through its Direction for Environment and Sustainable Development (Direction de l'Environnement et du Développement Durable, DEDD). The main stakeholders involved in this project are further detailed in the table below.

Table 4. Stakeholders' involvement.

Stakeholders	Involvement and responsibility
MHUE, through the DEDD	The MHUE is the Executing partner of the project. The DEDD hosts the Project Management Unit (PMU), and ensures good quality and timely results are obtained through monitoring and reporting on the project. The project works closely with MHUE staff to catalyse the anticipated institutional and policy changes necessary to achieve the project's outcomes.
Ministry of Agriculture, Water, Fisheries and Livestock Farming (Ministère de l'Agriculture, de l'Elevage, de la Pêche et des Ressources Halieutiques, MAEPERH), through its Directions for: • Large Construction Work; • Rural Hydraulics; • Agriculture and Forests; and • Livestock Farming.	The MAEPERH is in charge of agriculture and water-related matters in Djibouti. Towards the end of all projects, established water infrastructures (boreholes, wells, cisterns) are handed over to the Direction of Rural Hydraulics, which registers them onto the national database and is mandated to maintain them. Similarly, protection infrastructures (micro-dams, sills) are officially handed over to the Direction of Large Construction Work, that is then mandated to maintain them. In addition, the MAEPERH executed several projects in Adailou and Assamo, and was a key partner to coordinate with, so as to maximise synergies and avoid duplication of efforts.
Ministry of Higher Education and Research (Ministère de l'Enseignement Supérieur et de la Recherche, MESR) through the Djibouti Studies and Research Center (Centre d'Etudes et de Recherche de Djibouti, CERD)	The CERD is a key technical partner in Djibouti, that has the capacity to conduct studies on watershed dynamics and water protection infrastructure.
Prefectures and Regional Councils of Tadjourah and Ali Sabieh	Prefectures represent the national government within regions. However, they do not host technical services. Regional Councils have some technical capacity, mainly on agricultural matters.
Association Ecologie Village Adailou (EVA)	EVA is the main development Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) active in Adailou. It was created in 1996 by youths wanting to transform Adailou and prevent rural exodus. Since its creation, EVA has been implementing and catalysing numerous initiatives, including building a maternity, improving the access road, setting up protected areas for natural regeneration and installing a solar power plant. As such, EVA has a track record of partnering with multi-lateral (e.g. FAO[8]) and bilateral (French and South Korean cooperation) agencies. EVA participated in the initial identification of local needs

[8] Food and Agriculture Organisation

	for this project during the PPG phase. Its president was the project Focal Point (FP) for activities implemented in the Tadjourah region.
Rural Agricultural Association of Assamo (Groupement Paysan Agricole d'Assamo, GPAA)	The GPAA was founded over 20 years ago in Assamo, and is the main socio-economic organisation in the area. Members of the cooperative benefit from seedlings grown in the cooperative's nursery, coordinate to transport their garden products by road to Ali Sabieh, and exchange technical advice.
Local communities	The principal stakeholders are the local communities. These are the individuals whose vulnerability is increasing with climate change, and who benefit from the project's on-the-ground interventions.

F. Expected Results

Overarching outcomes expected from this project include: i); and ii).

Table 5. Project components, outcomes and outputs

Outcomes	Outputs
Component 1: Increased incorporation of climate change adaptation and adaptation finance in climate-resilient development planning at the national level	
Outcome 1: • institutional capacities for coordinated, climate-resilient planning strengthened • mechanisms and a de- risked investment environment established to catalyse finance for climate change adaptation	1.1 Reactivation of the National Climate Change Committee (NCCC) and provision of secretariat services to coordinate adaptation responses to climate change
	1.2 Development of a National Climate Change Strategy, informed by dynamic modelling for quantified scenario analysis of adaptation options which promote a Climate Change-Resilient Economy
	1.3 Support for the Government to find innovative financing options to catalyse finance for adaptation, including the establishment of an Environment and Climate Change Fund
Component 2: Reduced vulnerability to climate change for vulnerable communities in two targeted mountain regions: Adailou and Assamo	
Outcome 2: improved water management in the targeted regions to conserve scarce water resources and manage temporal flows to reduce flooding and erosion.	2.1. Construction of new water mobilisation infrastructure (a borehole, micro-dams, cisterns, sills retention ponds and infiltration galleries) implemented as climate change adaptation measures
	2.2. Support to expand and strengthen agro-pastoralism and pastoralism in the Weima and Assamo watersheds
	2.3. Reforestation and re-vegetation to support soil and water conservation and effectively reduce runoff and promote sustainable watershed management
	2.4. Development of Catchment Management Committees and Water Point Management Committees, to develop best practices for sustainable groundwater and surface water use and protect existing water points
	2.5. Support for women's livelihood diversification with the introduction of nurseries and training on fruit cultivation
Component 3: Enhanced human and institutional capacity for increased sustainable rural livelihoods among vulnerable communities in two targeted regions: Adailou and Assamo	

Outcome 3: • improved resilience to hydrological climate change risks • enhanced resilience to climate-mediated economic shocks through income generation and diversification	3.1 Regional Local Risk and Catastrophe Management Committees (LRCMCs), local civil protection and water officials, Catchment Management Committees (CMCs), local NGOs/CSOs and community members supported to implement drought and flood preparedness and adaptation measures
	3.2 Local commodity and handicraft production (gabion, poultry-breeding, beekeeping) supported as climate-resilient income generating and diversifying activities, accompanied by enhanced access to local and national markets
	3.3 Capacity building for local NGOs/CSOs (the Village Ecology Association in Adailou and the Assamo Agriculture Cooperative) to support project implementation and shared ownership of projects with the communities

V. FINDINGS

A. Project Design / Formulation

Analysis of LFA/Results Framework (Project logic /strategy; Indicators)

- Project logic

Overall, the project design is based on a solid and comprehensive presentation of the baseline situation, root causes and barriers. The theory of change takes into account all main aspects of the challenges raised by climate change adaptation in the target areas.

According to the evaluators, the main weakness of the project design lies in its overly ambitious intervention strategy, which materialises through:

- the overly comprehensive intervention framework, with more than 60 activities to be implemented. It looks like, even though the prodoc recognises that "no single initiative can completely remove all of the aforementioned barriers", the project attempted to do just this;
- intervention sites are scattered across two regions, with some of the sites in the Adailou region being remote and difficult to access[9]. Although the evaluators acknowledge the legitimate ambition to target the most vulnerable people, which are often the most secluded, the number and distance between sites constrained the possibility to supervise activities as often and thoroughly as necessary, increased the cost of execution and limited the impact of the project in each region; and
- the cost[10] of several activities was underestimated, given the Djiboutian context where capacities are scarce and many goods need to be imported. Moreover, costs of goods and equipment had changed between the time the Project Document was submitted and when the project started due to inflation. Examples of under-budgeted activities include the creation of retention ponds (Activity 2.1.5) and the protection of areas for revegetation (Activity 2.2.5).

According to the prodoc, the choice of intervention sites "has been guided by the priority interventions recommended by the NAPA including: (a) the poverty rate and the potential for income-generating activities; (b) the importance of surface water and future capture/storage potential; (c) agro-pastoral potential; (d) extreme vulnerability of the populations to climate change and a demonstrable need for support (…); (e) accessibility for project implementation (machinery, raw materials, supervision); (f) shared commonalities (needs, risks, barriers, socio- cultural context, etc.) with baseline projects while avoiding needless duplication; and (g) addressing the needs of both the Afar and Issa communities." These criteria are all relevant, but it would have been useful to assess these regions against each criterion and document this assessment in an annex to the prodoc.

- Project results framework

This TE appears to be the first time that a critical assessment of the project's results framework is conducted since the start of the project. No baseline study was carried out and the MTE did not suggest any changes, arguing that the results framework was perfectly coherent, robust and realistic[11]. Table 6 below provides an analysis of the results framework, and shows that several indicators and targets are not SMART[12].

[9] For example, travelling from Djibouti-City to Assa Guella one way would take the Project Coordinator almost a full day.

[10] Some budget lines in the prodoc do not make sense, for example "oceanography expert" for USD 228,000, and were likely pasted from another project budget. This casts doubt on the attention that was brought to the original budget.

[11] Despite comments from UNDP urging the reviewers to further analyse the results framework and identify any potential issues.

[12] Specific, Manageable, Agreeable, Realistic, Time-Bound

Table 6. Analysis of the results framework.

	Indicators	End-of-project targets	Remarks
Project objective: Reduction of climate-related vulnerabilities facing the inhabitants of mountainous regions of Djibouti through institutional strengthening, climate-smart water management and targeted investment	1. Number of households (HH) with enhanced livelihoods through access to water, improved ecosystem services and reforestation	2000 HHs have enhanced livelihoods due to water mobilisation and reforestation	These indicator and target can be considered as SMART. However, the suggested source of verification is "final socio-economic survey", which was not commissioned and could not be conducted in the context of this TE. Assessments are thus based on rough estimates.
	2. Reactivation of the National Climate Change Committee (NCCC) to coordinate climate change and resilience-building projects / activities.	Reactivation of the National Climate Change Committee (NCCC) with a clear mandate and a technically-capable Secretariat to support Climate Change adaptation interventions. The NCCC will be authorised to have the power of a Government Permanent Secretariat and the Ministry of the Environment (MHUE) will be officially designated as the house for the Secretariat.	These indicator and target can be considered as SMART. However, "reactivation" is not a specific enough. A better description would have been "at least 2 annual meetings during which members of the NCCC discuss and validate climate change-related projects/ activities for Djibouti".
Outcome 1: • institutional capacities for coordinated, climate-resilient planning strengthened • mechanisms and a de-risked investment environment established to catalyse finance for climate change adaptation	1. Development of a National Climate Change Strategy to guide the NCCC on appropriate coordination mechanisms and diversified, financing strategies to support adaptation-related activities in the long-term.	Creation of a National Climate Change Strategy informed by dynamic modelling results which guides the NCCC's work and provides strategic coherence to climate change adaptation initiatives in Djibouti.	These indicator and target can generally be considered as SMART. However, "creation" is not a specific enough. A better description would have been "endorsed" or "validated", since, as it stands, simply producing the document without further uptake or even official validation would suffice to meet the target.
	2. Development of a roadmap outlining how to establish and capitalise a Fund for the Environment and Climate Change.	Roadmap defining how to establish and capitalise a National Environment and Climate Change Fund	Same as above: the target would have been better phrased as "Developed and endorsed roadmap defining how to establish and capitalise a National Environment and Climate Change Fund which supports climate- smart

		which supports climate-smart adaptation activities for rural and urban populations in the long-term and which supports ongoing and future climate resilience projects.	adaptation activities for rural and urban populations in the long-term and which supports ongoing and future climate resilience projects". As it stands, the roadmap does not need to be officially endorsed or even disseminated. This is all the more problematic as the inter-ministerial nature of the National Environment and Climate Change Fund (NECCF) could potentially generate discussions on its governance, that would need to be facilitated / organised. However, the fact that the NECCF will be taken over by other GEF projects wards off the risk of the roadmap never being discussed and validated.
Outcome 2: Improved water management in the targeted regions (Adailou and Assamo) to conserve scarce water resources and manage temporal flows to reduce flooding and erosion	1. Number of micro-dams, cisterns, retention basins and bank fortifications built with the dual goals of reducing downstream impacts during flood events and retaining water to replenish groundwater resources.	Design and construction of 3 micro-dams; fifteen (15) 100 m3 cisterns, where each will provide potable water to 15 families; 16 semi- underground sills (8 in Adailou and 8 in Assamo); 2,000 m3 and 4,000 m3 of bank fortifications with rock-filled wirework (i.e. gabion) in Adailou and Assamo respectively to protect wadi banks and agricultural plots from erosion.	The cost of these infrastructures was under-estimated, resulting in an unrealistic target.
	2. Percentage of total hectarage of agro-pastoralists' land which is irrigated by boreholes.	30 hectares irrigated in Assamo and 30 hectares in Adailou.	Adailou: Activity 2.2.1 only plans for a 10ha area, which does not match with the target.
	3.Number of hectares of land replanted and reforested in Assamo, Adailou and Ayladou to: i) regenerate dwindling species and valued pastoral species and ii) reduce erosion.	70 ha in Assamo and 380 hectares in Adailou replanted and reforested.	Average planting density would need to be specified along with hectarage; otherwise, one investment – e.g. 1,000 seedlings planted – could meet two very different targets – e.g. reforest 100 ha of bare land or 200 ha of already sparsely vegetated land. It is understandable that this level of precision could not be reached in the prodoc; however, the target should have been reassessed once areas suitable for reforestation were identified.

	4. Number of pastoral centres (pastoretums) in each region	1 pastoretum in each region created.	These indicator and target can be considered as SMART.
	5. Number of women's tree seedling nurseries created in both Adailou and Assamo to i) produce seeds, ii) multiply species (e.g. wind-blocking plants, fruit-bearing trees, etc.), and iii) support reforestation	At least 1 women's tree seedling nursery created in both Adailou and Assamo.	These indicator and target can be considered as SMART.
	6. Creation of Catchment and Water Point Management Committees.	5 Catchment Management Committees formed (4 in Adailou in the Weima watershed and 1 in Assamo, the Juba watershed) and 27 Water Point Committees formed in total (one around each water point). All Committees will have 4 people including 1 female representative.	The baseline situation had not been properly assessed, since regional catchment committees already existed, and unformal "water point committees" were already managing the access to wells and other water points. The target could have been: "the governance of 2 regional catchment committees and 27 water points committees strengthened".
Outcome 3: • improved resilience to hydrological climate change risks. • enhanced resilience to climate-mediated economic shocks through income generation and diversification	1. Number of Automatic Weather Stations (AWSs) procured and installed.	One automatic weather station procured and installed in each region	The target should have included the formal handover of AWS to the National Meteorology Agency, to ensure sustainability and maintenance.
	2. Number of community adaptation measures implemented to build drought or flood-resilience.	One (1) community DRR/DRM adaptation measure implemented in each region (e.g. water point reinforcement with gabion, micro-dam de-silting).	These indicator and target can generally be considered as SMART.
	3. Number of rural inhabitants (disaggregated by gender and type of activity) who actively participate in bee-keeping, poultry raising	70 households (HHs) active in poultry breeding in Assamo and 50 HHs in Adailou. 14 people in Adailou and 6 in Assamo active in beekeeping and which have been provided appropriate materials.	These indicator and target can generally be considered as SMART.

	4. Number of local market stalls rehabilitated / created to facilitate access of Adailou and Assamo farmers/cultivators/pastoralists to larger regional markets.	Rehabilitation of the Ali-Sabieh market stall and creation of the Tadjourah market stall.	These indicator and target can generally be considered as SMART.
	5. % change in revenue to artisanal activities, poultry- breeding, bee-keeping and nursery sales (disaggregated by gender).	% change in revenue for community members (including % increase in supply of eggs, chicken, honey, nursery seedlings and gabion) - disaggregated by gender.	No target is specified. In general, such socio-economic indicators provide valuable information, but should not be inserted into results framework, as setting realistic targets is difficult. Surveys should be conducted as part as an effort to document lessons learned and best practices, rather than as a project evaluation exercise *per se*.

Assumptions and risks

Assumptions and risks were generally adequately identified during the formulation phase. However, some of the mitigation measures were not implemented. Table 7 below analyse each risk identified in the prodoc.

Table 7. Analysis of the risks and assumptions identified in the prodoc.

Risk / level identified in the prodoc	Mitigation measures identified in the prodoc	Comments
The project could encounter delays due to the lack of nationally- available expertise and human resources (high risk)	The project will establish a database of national and international experts able and willing to provide technical support to the project – for instance, to assist with infiltration gallery design and construction. When expertise is not available nationally, regional and international experts will be recruited. Close linkages with co-financing partners and baseline projects will also ensure the availability of technical expertise. The project will also benefit from structures and mechanisms established for the Great Green Wall Action Plan and the newly-commenced UNDP-AF project (both of which are also executed by the MHUE). The project design has been informed by prior hands-on analysis of Djiboutian pastoral systems by WISP and others and has – building on the lessons- learned from the PROMES-GDT project – deliberately adopted a conservative and focused approach to project activities.	This risk materialised, and one-year no-cost extension was requested. Although identified mitigation measures were appropriate, delays were indeed encountered because of the difficulties to find relevant national service providers in Djibouti (source: PIR 2016).
Low level of cooperation between executing institutions (medium risk)	The implementation arrangements have been discussed in detail at the Validation Workshop in January 2013, and have been accepted by all involved parties. MHUE is very willing to coordinate activities with the different executing agencies (as evidenced in the LDCF1 and Adaptation Fund projects), and the UNDP Country Office will closely monitor the project's execution so as to limit any deviations. All involved parties are strongly interested in the project activities and outcomes, and will benefit from capacity building from the project. Moreover, the project's support to the National Climate Change Committee is specifically intended to facilitate inter-ministerial and other inter- institutional coordination.	This risk was well identified and mitigation measures implemented were efficient.
Works associated with water mobilisation and retention infrastructures lead to unanticipated environmental impacts (medium risk)	UNDP's Environmental & Social Screening Procedure has been applied during project development, providing a thorough analysis of possible environmental impacts	Risk well identified. No adverse environmental impacts have materialised at this stage, but most water infrastructures were built in the last years of the project,

	of interventions, and their associated best management practices and mitigation strategies. Djibouti's EIA regulation will be applied during project implementation.	and there is still little hindsight as to whether such impacts could appear. An Environmental & Social Impact assessment was commissioned for the project as part of project activities, but was only finalised in January 2019, i.e. too late to influence the design of the project interventions; this activity should have been implemented early in the project. This study did not identify any specific risk.
The participatory approach could be ineffective due to lack of community ownership or lack of understanding on the part of implementers and beneficiaries (medium risk)	The participatory approach and community training components are central to the project's activities and will include awareness- raising at all stages of implementation, targeted training and the availability of technical expertise. Most community investments targeted by the projects (micro-dams, tree-planting, etc.) are relatively simple in their technical design and implementable in a reasonable timeframe (up to 1 year, as opposed to several years). For example, it is expected that the Catchment Management Committees and Water Point Management Committees will be trained and will start to provide maintenance and water quality materials during the first year. This will facilitate the participation and involvement of communities and will ensure that demonstrable results are achieved quickly, thereby avoiding frustration and credibility loss. Gender benefits for women and girls are also expected to be high (notably in the context of livelihood diversification through poultry-breeding and artisanal handicraft training); the engagement of women, as traditional managers of households, is expected to improve household participation rates.	This risk did not materialise, as the project never suffered from a lack of involvement from the communities. However, the prodoc was significantly over-optimistic when analysing the timeframe for infrastructure activities.
Water management strategies are made ineffective by an unanticipated increase in the frequency of flood events and continued drought which jeopardises agricultural and pastoral production (medium risk)	Project investments will be climate-proofed in terms of their locations, designs and capture capacities so as to be able to withstand forecast future climate stresses. Diversified and secured access to water resources, combining both surface and ground water, as well as the implementation of adapted cultivation techniques of	This risk was well identified, but mitigation measures were not adequately implemented on several occasions, leading to damages on the infrastructures (e.g. cisterns damaged in the Dora area, Adailou regions). This is further analysed in Table 11.

	forage and other crop varieties, will be used. Water points will be constructed with sufficient barriers, such as protective trees and rocks and covers, to prevent damage.	
Targeted farmers and pastoralists are sceptical and unwilling to use adaptation technologies / practices and engage in poultry breeding, beekeeping, etc. so as to diversify their livelihoods and/or income diversification strategies do not significantly increase household incomes (low risk)	The LDCF3 financed project will build on community farming practices. In both regions, best practices will be adopted. LDCF funds will provide strong support to local NGOs such as EVA (Adailou) and the Agricultural Cooperative of Assamo, which are both assisting the communities in agriculture and yet lack sustainable practice knowledge such as soil and water conservation methods and year-round crop choices. During stakeholder consultations, the community members voiced their desire and willingness to adopt aviculture and apiculture. Other rural communities have had success with both new livelihood methods in other initiatives facilitated by the Ministry of Agriculture. Significant training and expertise on how to introduce and upscale aviculture and apiculture will be provided by LDCF funds. Both IGAs can be easily scaled-up by breeding chickens and by increasing bee pollination. The agro-pastoral development component will start gradually, with the objective of identifying a limited number of 'lead' farmers and pastoralists who will serve as examples and possible success stories to others. Those lead farmers and pastoralists will learn how to use best adaptation technologies / practices, will serve as a basis for the organization of technical group meetings with other farmers, and will be able to test new livelihood practices. By designating motivated leaders, it is more likely that they will influence the community to use the same resilient- building practices. Also, by supporting capacity building of active, local NGOs, it will be more likely that knowledge transfer will be sustained in the future and that household incomes will increase and become diversified with time.	This risk cannot be assessed as the activities were not implemented (cf. Table 11).
Theft of solar panels from solar- powered wells and Automatic Weather Stations, pump parts or fencing materials (medium risk)	Borehole costs include the construction of protective casings around the solar panels and pump infrastructure to deter theft and prevent point contamination from	This risk did not materialise. Boreholes were fenced, but reforestation areas were not set up, and AWS were not guarded. The evaluators did not find traces of theft, but

	grazing animals. Fencing costs are quite high because robust materials will be installed to adequately protect the tree reforestation areas and agro-pastoral plots which will prevent easy theft of materials. Guards will be placed at the Automatic Weather Stations. Furthermore, the full participation of local communities will serve to reduce theft risks.	one AWS was removed by the community in Adailou, after a community member fell ill and the AWS was blamed for it; this happened despite the local community being sensitised about the AWS. This is a risk that had not been identified, and adds to the necessity of continuous awareness-raising and possibly fencing and guarding of technology equipment.
Unwelcome livestock (livestock from surrounding pastoralists) invading the agro- pastoral plots (medium risk)	Secure metal and stone fencing will be constructed around each agro-pastoral site to deter all unwelcome animals. This will prevent the risk of invading livestock and potential disputes between the pastoralists and agro-pastoralists. Awareness-raising by local NGOs/CSOs and by the local Water Point Management Committees will facilitate communication of the environmental and socio-economic importance of supporting best practices for agro-pastoralists and to protect the reforestation areas.	This risk cannot be assessed as the activity was not implemented in Adailou, and, although a 10 ha agro-pastoral plot was allegedly established in Didjandee (Ali Sabieh region), the evaluators did not visit it.
Limited capacity of local populations to perform maintenance on boreholes and solar-powered well pumps (medium risk)	Water Point Management Committees will be created to maintain the wells. The project includes activities to form and train these committees as well as to provide them with maintenance tools and water quality kits so that they will be empowered to perform minor repairs and detect when water quality is poor. The sub watershed-based Catchment Management Committees will serve as a liaison between the Water Point Management Committees and the Ministry of Water when maintenance or water quality issues are flagged.	This risk could not materialise as only one solar-powered borehole was installed in Adailou (and is not yet in use). One petrol-powered pump was provided to operate the nursery well in Adailou, and had to be replaced twice since it could not be repaired after breaking down due to a lack of budget for this. Water points committees are trained on the maintenance of the wells.
The National Climate Change Committee fails to meet regularly due to lack of incentives (low risk)	The NCCC's mandate and decree will be reactivated so that it will become an official convening body with the role of coordinating all climate and disaster risk management-related activities/projects/programmes through its legal mandate. It will be supported by a Secretariat and a National Climate Change Strategy to be developed through the LDCF3 financed project. The Strategy will be formally endorsed by the Office of the Prime Minister and will provide the Secretariat and the NCCC with a framework for assessing and achieving programming coherence. The Committee will be empowered by holding projects/programmes	The NCCC is meeting regularly. A presidential decree to formalise the existence of the NCCC was prepared and will be signed, giving additional visibility and recognition to the NCCC's activities. Moreover, capacity-building interventions for NCCC members have been organised under various projects, and have contributed to increase committee members'interest to participate.

	accountable to a formalised, recognised NCC Strategy. The NCC Strategy will provide influence for other ministries to participate. Furthermore, the potential establishment of a National Environment and CC Fund under the NCCC will reinforce its authority and influence. Cross-sectoral ministries and organisations on national, regional and local levels are expected to be beneficiaries of actions by the NCCC which will increase the Committee's influence and clout.	
Limited long-run support for rural mountain regions in terms of sustainable livelihood development (low risk)	LDCF funds will be used to diversify the livelihoods of the rural mountain populations in Adailou and Assamo. Support will be provided for the populations to cultivate revenue-bearing crops and trees, and to have a market place within reach to sell the fresh local produce. Also, funds will be used to support artisanal production (e.g. jams, handicrafts) and commercial sales of artisanal products in development for agro-pastoralists under an ongoing Adaptation Fund project.	It is difficult to assess whether this risk will materialise at this point. Clearly, the regions remain extremely dependent upon external aid for their development. The identified mitigation measures were not implemented.
There is insufficient technical and operational capacity within the regional governments to coordinate drought and flood preparedness (medium risk)	Component 3 of the project includes substantial training for the existing regional Local Risk and Catastrophe Management Committees (LRCMCs). They will be trained in how to understand and implement drought and flood preparedness with national and regional knowledge-sharing opportunities. Newly- procured weather stations and a risk inventory will support their ability to plan, forecast and alert populations. LDCF funds will also be used to provide a study tour of neighbouring Somaliland on how communities are constructing gabion and reinforcing wadi banks with gabion using a cash-for-work scheme. The study tour will be provided to the LRCMCs as well as to NGO representations and community heads. Study tour beneficiaries will also be supported to provide public awareness and to train community members on possible community-led flood and drought preparedness schemes.	This is risk well assessed and materialised during project implementation; the LRCMCs are not operational anymore due to lack of financial support to cover their activities.

Lessons from other relevant projects (e.g., same focal area) incorporated into project design

The main lesson learned explicitly incorporated into the prodoc is the need to coordinate with other relevant initiatives, with a view to generate synergies and avoid duplication of efforts. In particular, coordination mechanisms with Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)'s programme HYCOS[13] (implemented by the World Meteorological Organisation) and with the African Development Bank's "Drought Resilience and Sustainable Livelihoods Programme in the Horn of Africa" are extensively described.

Besides the need for coordination, the project designs built on the following lessons learned:

- the stone mulch method developed by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and Tokyo Agricultural University was identified as a promising water management method to be implemented in the Ali Sabieh region;
- procurement delays experienced in the LDCF-funded project "Implementing Adaptation Technologies in Fragile Ecosystems of Djibouti's Central Plains" (also known as LDCF 2) lead to several proposals to mutualise procurement processes and share training materials between the two projects, in order to minimise costs and save time; and
- the Rural Community Development and Water Mobilisation Project (PRODERMO) proved the value of participatory approaches and community involvement.

Other lessons learned anticipated to benefit the project during its implementation, but not actually described in the prodoc include:

- lessons learned from the GEF-funded project "Harmonizing support: a national programme integrating water harvesting schemes and sustainable land management" from: i) the rehabilitation and creation of livestock watering holes designed to collect runoff from small watersheds; and ii) fodder expansion through re-vegetation and reforestation;
- lessons learned on support to pastoralists with improved water point placement and management, rainwater harvesting schemes and reforestation, from the project "'Supporting Horn of Africa's Resilience – Securing Pastoral Systems in Djibouti (Projet de Sécurisation des Systèmes Pastoraux, PSSP); and
- lessons learned through EVA's expertise on reforestation, fencing and pasture regeneration, and GPAA's experience in terms of community involvement in Assamo (both participations were formalised through in-kind co-financing).

Planned stakeholder participation

A stakeholder involvement plan is included in Annex 6 of the prodoc. It describes planned stakeholder participation during implementation in three phases (developing a strategy and action plan; implementation; project completion and scale-up promotion), with a focus on community consultations for the identification of training beneficiaries and anticipated impact of water infrastructures. In addition, it is planned to disseminate information on the project's progress to interested governmental and non-governmental stakeholders.

Overall, planned mechanisms for stakeholder involvement include:

- meetings with the former members of the NCCC to obtain lessons-learned;
- preparation meetings with NGOs/CSOs to confirm their roles in project implementation;
- initial consultation meetings in target regions to discuss appropriate water mobilisation strategies;
- initial field surveys to develop selection criteria to choose the lead farmers and pastoralists who will receive training;
- initial consultations to choose the Water Point and Catchment Management Committees;

[13] Hydrological Cycle Observing System

- meetings with regional government officials to determine how to best reinforce their capacities in drought and flood preparedness;
- initiation of public awareness campaign on sustainable agro-pastoral and pastoral practices;
- public awareness campaign on community-based drought and flood management;
- periodic information briefings for government and co-financing institutions on activity development; and
- monitoring and evaluation campaigns.

Overall, the planned approach to stakeholder involvement is adequate. The project focal points, based in several institutions relevant to the project including the National Meteorological Agency (NMA) and the Directorate of Agriculture, are invited to attend all PSC (although their attendance cannot be garrantied by the project team). Moreover, the DEDD consulted with the NMA on an *ad hoc* basis. Ownership of AWSs is required by law to be transferred to the NMA at the end of the project; to this end, the project executing entity has sent letters to NMA and to the Directorate of Rural Water Resources. One significant caveat, which highlights key recommendations for future project design, is the absence of planned involvement of the National Office of Statistics as project executing partner within the Prodoc, which was later on identified as technical partner to conduct socio-economic surveys.

In general and for future projects, the involvement of partner institutions identified during the PPG phase[14] would need to be secured early on in the design phase, so that these partners can play an effective role during implementation[15].

Replication approach

An exhaustive description of the project's replication approach is enclosed in the prodoc. Whether this strategy was adequately implemented or not is not the object of this section, but the evaluators note that the original approach was sound. The replication strategy was twofold:

- strengthening the governance and policy framework for climate change adaptation (through the revitalisation of the NCCC, the creation of the Fund for the Environment and Climate Change and the design of the NCCS) to create an enabling environment for the planning, funding, implementation and monitoring of future adaptation initiatives; and
- conducting training activities to ensure that beneficiaries have the capacity to operate by themselves in the future and disseminate their skills. Planned trainings mainstreamed into the project's intervention strategy include:
    - two workshop training sessions by the Secretariat staff to the NCCC and other ministry/organization focal points on the costs and benefits of CC adaptation options, climate finance readiness and how to integrate CC scenario information into existing policies and ministerial strategies;
    - training for nationals on dynamic modelling through the learning-by-doing approach;
    - South-South cooperation to facilitate the exchange of lessons-learned by other countries on the development of a National Climate Change Strategy;
    - training for Water Point and Catchment Management Committees on sustainable operation and maintenance techniques for water infrastructure;
    - training for technicians in the relevant divisions of the MAEPERH on water mobilisation engineering techniques;

[14] The National Meteorological Agency is included in the Stakeholder Involvement matrix (Table 7) of the prodoc that describes the participation of various stakeholders at different phases of PPG, but at none of these phases is the NMA marked as "involved".
[15] The AWS, set up by the project, were operated by a consultant during the project implementation, not by staff members of NMA.

- training for agro-pastoralists and pastoralists on sustainable practices (soil and water conservation techniques, drip irrigation, production of drought-resistant forage, diversification of crops):
- study tour to Day Forest to capture lessons-learned on reforestation, fencing mechanisms, water capture, beekeeping, nursery cultivation and how to promote artisanal production and eco-tourism;
- training for women on nursery development and artisanal production, including marketing and sales of seedlings and grafts;
- training on the production of gabion, including proper weaving techniques;
- training on aviculture and apiculture;
- training for NGOs/CSOs on animal hygiene, nursery development, well maintenance, gabion construction, livelihood diversification, organization of communities and accounting; and
- training for 300 people, including local NGOs and regional extension services, in the two project regions on drought and flood mitigation measures, including a study tour for local representatives on other mountain-based community-led drought and flood mitigation practices.

UNDP comparative advantage

UNDP's main comparative advantage put forward in the prodoc is its "long-standing experience in supporting climate change adaptation, climate finance, water management and rural development projects." In particular, UNDP has a track record of working with governments to strengthen institutional and policy frameworks for development and climate change adaptation. In-house expertise can be mobilised to assist the UNDP Country Office (CO) when necessary. UNDP Djibouti oversees an extensive portfolio relevant to this project, with several initiatives on disaster risk management, water infrastructure works, livestock re-stocking, re-vegetation and reforestation, pasture rehabilitation, decentralised political authorities and poverty reduction. Examples of such projects included:

- "Developing agro-pastoral shade gardens as an adaptation strategy for poor rural communities";
- "Community-Driven Early Recovery for Drought-Affected Poor Rural Households in Djibouti";
- "Cash for Work to Restore Livelihoods and Reduce Dependency on Relief"; and
- "National Decentralisation Plan Support Project".

The Djibouti UNDP CO also has significant experience with the design and management of micro-financing schemes, and supported the improvement of the legislative framework through the elaboration of a set of policies and regulations for the micro-finance sector. Such experience would help with the implementation of Activity 3.2.7 "Introducing cookstoves by determining the design of a micro-finance lending scheme to be linked with cookstove distribution".

Finally, the Djibouti UNDP CO participated in UNDP's global "Strategic Initiative to Address Climate Change in LDCs" ("Boots On The Ground") programme, which strengthened 26 UNDP CO' capacity to deliver high-quality and timely policy advice on climate change at the country level. Through this programme, the Djibouti UNDP CO benefited from a full-time Climate Change Policy Advisor who assisted the Government with policy advisory and capacity development services.

Overall, UNDP's comparative advantage was convincingly laid out.

Linkages between project and other interventions within the sector

Synergies and planned coordination with baseline projects are extensively and appropriately described in Section 2.3.1 of the prodoc. The most significant projects to link with include the following:

- "Rural Community Development and Water Mobilisation Project" (Projet de développement rural communautaire et de mobilisation des eaux, PRODERMO)
- "Hydrological Cycle Observing System" (HYCOS) programme

- "Supporting Horn of Africa's Resilience – Securing Pastoral Systems in Djibouti" (Projet de Sécurisation des Systèmes Pastoraux, PSSP)
- "Programme on Climate Change Adaptation and Mitigation in the COMESA-EAC-SADC[16] Region"
- "Programme of Surface Water Mobilisation and Sustainable Land Management" (Programme de Mobilisation des Eaux de Surface et de Gestion Durables des Terres, PROMES- GDT); and
- "Drought Resilience and Sustainable Livelihoods Programme in the Horn of Africa".

Linkages are described in terms of mutualisation of studies, geographical coverage, sharing of lessons learned and complementarity between baseline interventions and the project's interventions.

Concretely, coordination across projects was planned to be ensured through the Project Steering Committee as well as two Regional Committees. The UNDP CO could also facilitate coordination across projects in its portfolio. In practice however, the Regional Committees were not created, and coordination was sought at the central level. Inter-ministerial meetings were held to try and coordinate interventions in the two target areas. Nevertheless, this attempt to centralise coordination was deemed less efficient than decentralised and unformal coordination. Community consultations to identify where each project was intervening and unformal consultations at the Project Managers level were therefore conducted on an *ad-hoc* basis. This proved sufficient to ensure on-the-ground coordination, but the establishment of Regional Committees as planned could have been instrumental to secure the involvement of decentralised authorities, which the evaluators found to be limited.

Management arrangements

The planned management structure is presented in the diagram below[17].

Figure 1. Management structure diagram. Source: prodoc.



The evaluators note a disconnect between the diagram and the narrative in the prodoc; the latter seems to have been taken from another project and not properly adapted to this project. For example, the RCs

[16] Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, East African Community, Southern African Development Community

[17] RCs described in the prodoc did not appear on this original diagram.

and Technical Committee described in the narrative do not appear on the diagram, and Regional Committees were not created in practice. Likewise, ToRs for a Chief Technical Advisor were included in the prodoc, but this position does not appear on the diagram and was not advertised for. Finally, the composition of the Project Management Unit was not adequate and had to evolve during implementation. In particular, two regional Focal Points (FP) – one in the Tadjourah region and one in the Ali Sabieh region – were hired. These positions were relevant to serve as local relays with communities as well contractors, given that the Project Manager could not always be present on both sites. The Financial and Administrative Assistant who had been initially hired became Project Assistant, with an extended job description including accompanying consultants to the project sites and monitoring construction work. Another Financial and Administrative Assistant therefore had to be hired.

Overall, the evaluators note that managements arrangements are not consistently described across the various relevant sections of the prodoc (diagram, narrative, ToRs), and thus do not provide clear guidance to implement these arrangements. An assessment of management arrangements implemented in practice is provided in the Section B.

B. Project Implementation

Adaptive management (changes to the project design and project outputs during implementation)

Two types of changes made to the project design during the implementation can be identified. Some changes were motivated by the perceived irrelevance of some of the activities contained in the prodoc (e.g. establishment of retention ponds). The other type of changes was in reaction to external implementation constraints:

- budgetary constraints, induced either by the initial under-budgeting of project activities (e.g. water protection infrastructures) or by unforeseen expenses that entailed significant budget reallocation (e.g. construction of an educative garden; reconstruction of damaged water protection infrastructures);
- delays in implementation (the causes of which are analysed in below);
- excessive number of activities, which made implementation too cumbersome; and
- natural disasters.

It should be noted that none of these changes – neither voluntary nor constrained – was ever translated into official modifications to the results-based framework (RBF). As a result, project progress was reported against the original RBF throughout implementation. No systematic assessment of the results framework was conducted after the validation of the project. A proper baseline study and the MTE could have been opportunities to adjust indicators, baseline levels and targets, and thus report progress against a realistic framework.

After the flash floods of May and August 2016, which are characterised as exceptional floods, and damaged or destroyed several water protection infrastructures in Adailou, decision was taken to repair some of the infrastructures. An assessment was commissioned to a French engineering firm[18], which produced a thorough report containing a critical analysis of the initial construction standards of the infrastructures as well as structural recommendations for reparations. Such recommendations included:

- the creation of sills on the right bank affluent of the main wadi;
- the establishment of gabion foundations for sills and micro-dams;
- the limitation of the number of infrastructures so as to shift the focus on quality.

[18] Compagnie D'Aménagement des Coteaux de Gascogne. January 2017. Bassin versant de l'oued de Weima. Diagnostic hydraulique et structurel des sites d'Adaylou, Abahloïta et Guemellou.

This report could be of value for many future initiatives in Djibouti and in the region, and the evaluators recommend that it be largely disseminated within MHUE, MAEPERH and UNDP.

Table 8 below presents those of the planned activities that have either been modified, partly implemented or not implemented. Out of 51 planned activities, 13 have not been implemented (18 %).

Table 8. Activities modified, partly implemented and not implemented.

Modified activities	Activities partly implemented	Activities not implemented
• 2.1.3 Design and construction of 1 borehole to feed 1 agro-pastoral pilot plot in Adailou and construction/rehabilitation of 10/2 shallow wells in Adailou/Assamo, all with solar pumping systems (partly implemented). o Modified as: rehabilitation / construction of 32 wells instead of 16, and drilling of a solar-powered borehole. • 2.2.1 Creation of one 10 ha agro-pastoral plot in Adailou with a 200 m3 reservoir and a facility with a capacity of 100 kg for forage storage (partly implemented). o Modified as: 10 ha agro-pastoral plot in Ali Sabieh with reservoir and solar-powered borehole. • 2.2.12 One study tour to Day Forest to capture lessons learned on reforestation, fencing mechanisms and community involvement (replaced by exchange visits for Adailou and Assamo market gardeners in Ali Sabieh and Dikhil) • 2.4.4 Tree planting around 10 shallow wells / water points, including seeding, preparation of soil and planting costs (not implemented). o Modified as: 1,000 trees planted in Adailou	• 2.2.2 Solar power equipment for the existing agro-pastoral plots in Assamo (not implemented). • 2.3.1 Re-seeding and re-vegetation for pastoralists on 360 ha and 290 ha of land in Adailou and Assamo respectively to prevent erosion and improve groundwater supplies in watersheds (partly implemented on a much smaller scale). • 2.3.2 Tree replanting and reforestation to generate pasture and minimise erosion on 290 ha in Assamo, 240 ha in Adailou and 120 ha in Ayladou (near Adailou; this activity was not completed as its budget was used to fund the assessment study of damages to water protection infrastructures after the 2016 floods). • 2.4.2 Training for 27 community Water Point Management Committees (WPMCs) at each water point on sustainable operation and maintenance techniques for wells and solar-powered pumping systems, including provision of maintenance tools and water quality tests (partly implemented but no solar-power pumping system training as equipment was not installed except in two instances).	• 1.2.2 Training for national stakeholders on dynamic modelling, including the incorporation of cross-sectoral data. • 1.2.3 Studies to assess the burden of climate change on the public budget by conducting a Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Review. • 1.2.4 Publication of robust adaptation measures which minimize risks associated with climate change while maximizing poverty reduction. • 2.1.10 Training for technicians in the relevant divisions of the Ministry of Agriculture (Large Hydraulic Works Division and the Division of Water within the Ministry of Agriculture) on water mobilisation engineering techniques (instead of planned training, one civil engineering consultant was hired for the design and monitoring of construction work). • 2.2.9 Baseline study on the use of natural resources including a livestock census and survey. • 2.4.1 Creation and training of 5 Catchment Management Committees by a water management and water hygiene specialist to develop Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and good water practice guidelines for sustainable groundwater and surface water use throughout the watershed (not implemented as committees reportedly existed already and guidelines were not developed) .

		• 3.1.2 Study tour of similar mountain regions, such as in neighbouring Somaliland, on community- based drought and flood mitigation practices for 2 mountain community representatives, 2 NGO representatives and 2 regional government authority staff members. • 3.2.2 Formalized collaboration with private and public sector neighbours who could be potential buyers and distributors of artisanal products (e.g. the new Port of Tadjourah). • 3.2.3 Training to improve commercial aspects of artisanal production. • 3.2.5 Materials and training for 70 families in Assamo and 50 families in Adailou to conduct poultry-breeding. • 3.2.6 Materials and training for 20 people (14 in Adailou and 6 in Assamo) on beekeeping. • 3.2.7 Introducing cookstoves by determining the design of a micro-finance lending scheme to be linked with cookstove distribution. • 3.2.8 Socio-economic survey (disaggregated by gender) to quantify the benefits of the livelihood diversification schemes supported through the LDCF3 financed project.

A new project activity, namely the construction of an educative garden near Ali Sabieh (cost USD 173,333), was added to the project in 2018 (the educative garden was not completed at the time of this evaluation). This activity was a direct request from the government and a 'national priority'; the insertion of this activity as part of the project (and thereby the removal of other planned activities) was discussed during the PSC meeting of 13 December 2018.

Partnership arrangements (with relevant stakeholders involved in the country/region)

The main partnership arrangements implemented were with the MAEPERH, EVA, GPAA and CERD. The observations below on partnership arrangements can be made.

- Partnering with EVA and GPAA for activities in the Adailou and Assamo areas, respectively, was particularly relevant. This enabled to liaise with local communities through partners with a solid history of community engagement and good knowledge of local dynamics. While the partnership with GPAA went smoothly, some issues were faced with EVA. This is mainly because of a misunderstanding on procurement eligibility that generated some frustration. The president of EVA was paid to be the local FP of the project, and could not understand why EVA would not be the budget holder for Adailou activities. In addition, he expected EVA to be contracted by the project

for most activities to be undertaken in the area. This was neither possible – because of procurement procedures – nor advisable – because EVA is not a private or for-profit structure and does not have competence in all domains.

- The evaluators noted efforts from the project team to involve Regional Councils, mostly through visits during field missions and invitations to PSC meetings. In the future, these efforts should be continued, especially as the MAEPERH now has full-time technical teams stationed in regional capitals that can be of assistance. Prefectures do not have the technical capacity to participate in the project's activities, and referred the PMU to local partners (i.e. EVA and GPAA) when the PMU asked for guidance or support.
- Two institutions were approached to establish technical partnerships, namely the National Office of Statistics and the National Meteorological Agency, respectively to establish the baseline and assess progress against Indicator 5 of Component 3, and to take ownership of the AWSs set up by the project. However, due to a lack of fund to capacitate the National Office of Statistics and enable it to implement planned activities (e.g. socio-economic survey), the baseline for Indicator 5 was never assessed[19]. With regards to the AWSs, which were operated by a national consultant during the project, they were not in use at the time the evaluation was conducted[20][21]. To strengthen technical partnerships during project implementation and facilitate ownership transfer as required, it is recommended to further engage with relevant institutions during the PPG phase, in order to define the role and capacity needed to participate in project execution. For example, these consultations could have led to allocating a small budget to National Office of Statistics in order to analyse baseline and end-of project situation with regards to Indicator 5 of Component 3.

Feedback from M&E activities used for adaptive management

The two main sources of recommendations from M&E activities are the MTE and annual PIRs.

The MTE included nine official recommendations, each time with the identity of the person / institution in charge of implementing it. Recommendations A.1 (expedite the updating of the NCCC mandate), B.1 (reallocate budget to repair damaged infrastructures) and C.1 (reassess the need to create water catchment committees in light of already-existing institutions, so as to avoid duplication) were taken up by the project management, while the other ones were not implemented. In hindsight, it is unfortunate that recommendations B.2 (study market opportunities to generate business for the gabion workshops), B.4 (identify financing mechanisms to sustain the protection of revegetation areas, in particular through the remuneration of eco-guards) and D.1 (mainstream climate change into feasibility studies for the design of water infrastructures) were ignored, as they could have anticipated on the exit strategy and maximised the sustainability of associated project outcomes.

Recommendations formulated in Project Interim Reports (PIR) mainly emanated from the Regional Technical Advisor (RTA). These recommendations were mostly general and high-level, such as increasing the delivery rate of the project (2017 PIR), finding ways to accelerate procurement processes (2017 PIR), re-assessing risks and keeping a risk log (2018 PIR), following the M&E plan laid out in the prodoc (2018 PIR), taking MTE recommendations into account (2018 PIR), continuing to comply with the agreed logframe (2019 PIR) and starting to plan early for the TE (2019 PIR). These recommendations were followed to a large extent. For example, as per RTA recommendation, the project management focused on delivering on-the-ground activities in the last year of the project, in order to achieve tangible results towards the overall objective of increasing the resilience of vulnerable populations.

Project Finance

[19] Planned activities to support income-generating activities such as poultry and honey production were not implemented anyway, so no progress could have been assessed should the National Office for Statistics had cooperated. However, it would have been useful to establish the baseline data for future reference.
[20] The evaluators noted, during the mission, that the 2 AWS they were able to check were not opperaitonal; and another one had been removed by community members.
[21] The evaluators note that a letter was sent to NMA in order to transfer ownership of the AWS.

The overall budget for the project described in the prodoc is USD 34,009,452, including a LDCF grant of USD 5,379,452. Eight sources of co-financing were confirmed, for a total of USD 28,630,000, with USD 1,200,000 of in-kind co-financing and the rest in grant.

To reconstruct project expenditures, the evaluators had access to three sources of data, namely annual project reports produced by the PMU, annual budget logs from UNDP (which served as the basis for annual audits) and a budget revision prepared for the request for the one-year, no-cost extension. Discrepancies can be found in some budget categories between these three sources. This point was brought up in audits, and it would be advisable to harmonise budget reporting frameworks between DEDD and UNDP.

The tables and graph below were produced based on the supposedly most up-to-date expenditure data, namely UNDP budget logs.

Figure 2. Planned and actual expenses.



Table 9. Annual disbursement rates.

	Original budget (%)	Actual expenses (%, as of January 2020)
Component 1	11	9
Component 2	69	79
Component 3	14	7
PMC	4	4
M&E	2	0*
Total	100	100

**: cf. remark below.*

Component 2 accounts for almost 80% of the project expenditures. This is mostly because of the under-estimation of gabion costs in the original budget and repair costs of damaged water protection infrastructures. Component 3 suffered the most from these budget reallocations, with several livelihood-support activities not conducted.

It should be noted that no specific reporting was conducted for M&E expenditures. The reason provided to the evaluators is that the UNDP CO received instructions to merge M&E budget lines within each component. This is an issue, as: i) UNDP could not provide a reconstructed list of M&E expenses, and therefore overall M&E expenditures cannot be assessed; and ii) it biases the comparison between planned budget and expenditures, since a separate M&E budget was initially provided in the prodoc.

Table 10. Annual expenditures.

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Total
Total	446,180	1,349,346	1,118,236	1,625,680	811,315	5,350,757

Disbursements were significantly delayed at the beginning of project implementation because of the time taken to hire the PMU. In addition, procurement delays for construction work were incurred. As a result, a one-year no-cost extension was requested and granted. It should be noted that some project expenditures have not yet been registered (completion of educative garden, connection of Adailou standposts to the borehole, final payments for the consultant in charge of the Fund roadmap).

Annual audits conducted for 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018 were consulted by the evaluators[22]. Key observations from the audits are presented below.

- Audits consistently noted that social insurance contributions and income taxes had been taken off project staff salaries (as requested by Djiboutian law), but the corresponding sums had not been transferred to the social security and fiscal administration. This seems to have been resolved with repeated delays. Generally, all recommendations from audits have been implemented.
- The 2015, 2016 and 2018 audits found that public procurement rules (namely obtaining at least three quotes for a public call for tender before a winning bid can be selected) had not always been respected. In response to the matter, UNDP indicated that a consultancy would be hired to train the PMU on procurement procedures, but this was apparently not done.
- The PMU and UNDP use different reporting systems for expenses and consolidation between the two systems is difficult, making budget auditing and analysis uneasy. This could have been solved if the PMU had been trained on financial reporting, as requested by the PMU.
- The PSC did not hold any meeting in 2016.

Finally, it should be noted that UNDP does not report on co-finance expenditure in the budget reports.

Monitoring and evaluation: design at entry and implementation (*)

Section 6 of the prodoc described M&E arrangements for the project. These arrangements are generic and generally apply across projects in the GEF UNDP portfolio. The following observations on the implementation of M&E can be made:

- sizable budget for a part-time M&E officer had been set aside in the prodoc, but no dedicated M&E officer was hired. As a result, daily reporting was done jointly by the Project Manager and the Project Administrative & Financial Officer;
- the quality of mission reports prepared by the PMU and consultants is uneven, in particular those prepared at the beginning of the project implementation. While some of these reports include useful information, others are almost empty and seem to have only been produced for administrative purposes;
- an intern from the UNDP CO could have been hired at the beginning of the project, to assist the project team with the M&E of the project. However, this intern – with limited experience being an intern – was only hired during the project's last year, which impaired the M&E process during the course of the project;
- no M&E strategy was developed to guide reporting work in practice;

[22] The audit for 2019 was not available at the time of the evaluation.

- the evaluators found the MTE to be of limited practical use and relatively complacent. Despite a few observations and recommendations – generally very generic –, the MTE did not provide actionable advice that could effectively help the PMU improve the delivery of the project's outputs; and
- the evaluators did not have access to any report from mission co-lead by the PMU and UNDP CO, as was planned for in the prodoc.

Rating:
- design at entry: satisfactory
- implementation: moderately satisfactory
- **overall: moderately satisfactory**

UNDP and Implementing Partner implementation / execution (*) coordination, and operational issues

- Implementation

  UNDP's role as implementing partner in the NIM framework is described in the request for the provision of support services (Annex 3.a of the prodoc). As such, the UNDP CO's role is to procure the services of international consultants as required, process payments and provide "services related to the administration of training needs". In addition, the UNDP CO and/or the RTA provided technical and implementation oversight through participation to PSC meetings and field visits, and contributed to the writing of PIRs. UNDP's role was generally adequate; however, the below observations can be made.
  - Delays were experienced in the processing of payments by UNDP, especially during the first years of project implementation. To improve and fasten the payment process, the PMU and UNDP organised regular meetings for financial training purpose. As a result, payment processes were largely improved after Year 4 of the project.
  - The PMU was dissolved when the TE started effectively[23]. As a result, involvement was only on a voluntary basis and on the team members' free time. Availability of the project team did not prove to be a significant issue, but the lack of preparation of the field mission did not facilitate the evaluation (e.g. people not warned that a mission would visit them, so some of them would not be available).
  - UNDP did not recruit a national consultant as part of the evaluation team[24]; this is good practice for the conduction of mid-term and final evaluation as national consultants often have a better understanding of the context (political, socio-economic, cultural) in which the project takes place, including challenges and barriers to implementation.
- Execution

  The DEDD was the executing partner for this project, and hosted the PMU. The evaluators noted the dynamism and sense of ownership of the Project Manager (PM) and Project Administrative & Financial Officer in particular. Both were relatively inexperienced, although the allocated budget for the PM (USD 2,500 per month) would have allowed to hire an experienced person. The project staff gained valuable experience and capacities executing this project, and this should be capitalised upon in the future.

  The PMU operated in a Djiboutian context characterised by significant constraints in terms of capacities, and had to implement over 60 activities with a limited budget and scattered across several distant sites. The main measure implemented to mitigate the challenges linked to the lack of capacity was the creation of a pool of three experts (a hydrologist, an agronomist and a socio-economist), shared with another project, during the first three years. This pool sat in the DEDD full

[23] It is good practice to start the TE at least three months before dissolution of the PMU, so that the full team is still contracted by the project and available to prepare and facilitate the evaluation.
[24] This was due to lack of suitable candidates.

time, and was a useful resource for the PMU, who could consult with them on *ad-hoc* issues in a very flexible manner.

This general Djiboutian context should be kept in mind to put the several execution issues described below into perspective.

- It is critical to ensure good, regular communication between the PMU staff members located in Djibouti Ville, and those located on the project sites, namely the local FPs in Adailou and Assamo – e.g. by organising weekly calls or meetings, to ensure they are aware of the project's objectives and to follow up on implementation progress and challenge. For example, the Adailou FP appeared confused about the project's indicators and targets, although these had been shared with him at project onset. In Assamo, the FP was not able to provide a close follow-up of project activities towards the end of the project for personal reasons. Regular communication with the central PMU would help ensure a good understanding of the project by all executing parterns, as well as adapt project management for example by supporting the FP when he/she is not able to fulfil its role.
- The Adailou FP was not in Adailou full time, as he lived in Djibouti-City. For this reason, he was not able to oversee all the construction work effectively, especially at the most distant sites (e.g. Assa Gueila, Guirrori).
- The Administrative & Financial Officer provided precious support, especially to liaise with the Adailou community. However, his lack of experience in terms of technical project implementation and absence of a technical background did not allow him to oversee and monitor project activities as a proper M&E officer could have.
- Difficulties in sourcing of contractors, adequate consultants and service providers, procurement time to issue contracts, and difficulties to acquire specific construction material in Djibouti (e.g. gabion cage had to be sourced from Dubai) have led to delays in implementing some project activities, in particular building or rehabilitation of water management infrastructure.
- No international Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) was hired, even though this position was planned for in the prodoc. As a result, the only non-local advice that the execution team could benefit from was from the UNDP Regional Technical Advisor (RTA) and some specialised international consultants. Even though the RTA's support was precious, it intervened at a strategic level and not at the daily, technical level. Having a dedicated expert to support the PMU, with knowledge in project management, implementation and reporting processes (national or international), could have helped manage some of the execution as well as M&E challenges, and would have complemented the technical support available within the DEDD, both with in-house technical expertise within the DEDD and with the recruitment of three specialised national consultants shared across projects executed by the DEDD.
- The DEDD would have a strong interes t to share execution responsibilities with other partners when relevant. For example, the execution of livelihood-support activities (poultry, beekeeping) could have been delegated to the MAEPERH. Similarly, the National Office of Statistics should have been a key technical partner; however, because it was not consulted early in the project implementation and no financial compensation for its involvement was offered, it refused to participate, thereby weakening the sustainability and consistency of some of the project's results. Overall, sharing responsibilities with relevant partners would be likely to enhance overall delivery of the project's outputs.

Overall, the project execution suffered from some shortcomings, which provide good recommendations for future prpjects. Some of them were linked to the lack of experience of the PMU to implement such project; with this regards, improvements have been noted in the course of the project, through trainings and 'learning-by-doing' practice, and notably payment processes were largely improved after Year 4 of the project. The two key recommendations to guide the execution of future projects are :

1) It is critical, as good practice, to keep track in written form of the justifications and validation process to any changes in the project framework – including the cancellation and addition of activities – for transparency and clarity (with this project, it concerns the 18% of the planned activities/ sub-activities not implemented – see p.40). Justification must be made with regards to how such changes can be mainstreamed within the project's intervention logic.

2) Technical partnerships with relevant governmental (and non-governmental) institutions need to be set up early and their operationalisation detailed at PPG phase, for example how relevant technical partners can be involved in the execution of specific project activities in order to ensure their ownership. For exemple, a joint execution and operaitonalisation of the AWSs with NMA during project implementation would have facilitated the ownership transfer process, which has been launched by the government at the end of the project. This is an important lessons learned for future project implementstion in Djibouti.

Rating:

- implementation: satisfactory
- execution: moderately satisfactory
- **overall: moderately satisfactory**

C. Project Results

Overall results (attainment of objectives) (*)

The results of the project against each indicator are assessed in the table below. Please note that remarks pertaining to sustainability, efficiency and other relevant evaluation criteria have been left out of this table for the most part, and inserted into the relevant sections of the report.

Table 11. Assessments of results against end-of-project targets for each indicator.

	Indicators	Baseline	End-of-project targets	Rating and justification
Project objective: Reduction of climate-related vulnerabilities facing the inhabitants of mountainous regions of Djibouti through institutional strengthening, climate-smart water management and targeted investment	1. Number of households (HH) with enhanced livelihoods through access to water, improved ecosystem services and reforestation	All target farmers and pastoralists require strengthened livelihoods to become less vulnerable to climate shocks. Livelihoods need to be strengthened by mobilizing water with physical infrastructure for use during the dry season (e.g., earth dams and retention basins, boreholes, etc.). Also, livelihoods need to be strengthened with reforestation/afforestation and sustainable land use practices. Farmers and pastoralists need to be provided technical and applied knowledge on soil and water conservation methods and other sustainable practices to ensure that they can continually make use of productive ecosystem services.	2000 HHs have enhanced livelihoods due to water mobilisation and reforestation	The 2019 PIR reported that 1,665 households (83%) had had their livelihoods enhanced due to water mobilisation thanks to improved and new water infrastructure (borehole, wells and thresholds). No further reforestation activity was conducted since the end of the 2019 PIR reporting period, and no additional agro-forestry plot was added. One borehole was drilled and equipped with a solar-power pump in Adaylou, and is supposed to be connected to standposts in early 2020. Although it is difficult to assess how many households will eventually benefit from this new equipment, the overall number of beneficiary HH can be estimated to come close to the end-of-project target. **Rating: satisfactory**
	2. Reactivation of the National Climate Change Committee (NCCC) to coordinate climate change and resilience-building projects / activities.	The former National Climate Change Committee has effectively ceased to exist.	Reactivation of the National Climate Change Committee (NCCC) with a clear mandate and a technically- capable Secretariat to support Climate Change adaptation interventions. The NCCC will be	The NCCC was reactivated, its structure was clarified (1 Plenary Committee chaired by Secretary Generals of relevant ministries, 1 Technical Committee split into four thematic groups – adaptation, mitigation, funding and research) and a Permanent Secretariat was established (6 people, trained to ensure institutional memory in case of turn-over).

			authorised to have the power of a Government Permanent Secretariat and the Ministry of the Environment (MHUE) will be officially designated as the house for the Secretariat.	A presidential decree to formalise and publicise the existence of the NCCC was prepared and will be signed in the near future. The MHUE is aware that the strengthening of the NCCC is a need that does not end with this project; activities are planned to keep capacitating it after the project termination. **Rating: highly satisfactory**
Outcome 1: • institutional capacities for coordinated, climate-resilient planning strengthened • mechanisms and a de-risked investment environment established to catalyse finance for climate change adaptation	1. Development of a National Climate Change Strategy to guide the NCCC on appropriate coordination mechanisms and diversified, financing strategies to support adaptation-related activities in the long-term.	A National Climate Change Strategy (NCCS) does not exist in Djibouti.	Creation of a National Climate Change Strategy informed by dynamic modelling results which guides the NCCC's work and provides strategic coherence to climate change adaptation initiatives in Djibouti.	A NCCS was produced and validated. It does serve its purpose of guiding adaptation planning in Djibouti, as institutions refer to it. However: • it is not based on dynamic modelling results; and • it does not include action plans to operationalise general adaptation orientations. Activities 1.2.2 (training for national stakeholders on dynamic modelling, including the incorporation of cross-sectoral data) and 1.2.3 (Studies to assess the burden of climate change on the public budget by conducting a Climate Public Expenditure and Institutional Review) were not conducted. **Rating: moderately satisfactory**
	2. Development of a roadmap outlining how to establish and capitalise a Fund for the	No mechanism to attract and channel funding for medium- to long-term climate resilience-strengthening activities.	Roadmap defining how to establish and capitalise a National	A roadmap is being produced by an international consultant. It had not been submitted to MHUE nor

	Environment and Climate Change.		Environment and Climate Change Fund which supports climate-smart adaptation activities for rural and urban populations in the long-term and which supports ongoing and future climate resilience projects.	validated by the time of the TE. In particular, the governance of the future Fund for the Environment and Climate Change – which will potentially be a main discussing point – had not been agreed upon. Also to note that DEDD has expressed its concerns about the new approach adopted by UNDP to design this fund, which would not focus only on environmental and climate change-related issues anymore. Despite this delay, it was recognised early on that the process leading to the design and institutionalisation of the Fund would not realistically be completed by the time of project closure. It was then decided to associate two other GEF projects to this initiative, so that the process could carry on. The roadmap of the Fund is expected by August 2020. **Rating: cannot be assessed**.
Outcome 2: Improved water management in the targeted regions (Adailou and Assamo) to conserve scarce water resources and manage temporal flows to reduce flooding and erosion	1. Number of micro-dams, cisterns, retention basins and bank fortifications built with the dual goals of reducing downstream impacts during flood events and retaining water to replenish groundwater resources.	1 borehole in each zone, 10 shallow wells in Adailou, 14 in Assamo	Design and construction of 3 micro-dams; fifteen (15) 100 m3 cisterns, where each will provide potable water to 15 families; 16 semi-underground sills (8 in Adailou and 8 in Assamo); 2,000 m3 and 4,000 m3 of bank fortifications with rock-filled wirework (i.e. gabion) in Adailou and Assamo respectively to	Adailou: • 2 micro-dams The micro-dams are a key achievement of the project in Adailou. They limit the risk of damages in case of flooding and have proven efficient in terms of replenishment of groundwater resources. On one occasion in particular, i.e. after the rains of June/July 2016, the aquifer was recharged enough so that the main well of the village could

			protect wadi banks and agricultural plots from erosion.	sustain the domestic needs of the Adailou population for 2 years. In Adailou, there might be a risk of fragilisation of banks downstream of the largest dam in case of heavy rains, because to the change in the flow of the wadi. • 16 cisterns of 100 m^3 each: o 5 cisterns work well, i.e. have been filled by rains at least to some extent since their construction, and show no operational issue o 7 cisterns have not received any recharge since their construction, so they usefulness is difficult to assess. Their location was a compromise between expert advice and community demand, but no study was produced to justify these choices. At least 4 of these cisterns show signs of wear (cracks), which is likely a result of the non-respect of best practices for the construction, namely filling the cisterns with water when they are new. o 4 cisterns in the Dora area were damaged from flooding because they do not meet construction standards. In at least one

				case, the location indicated by the expert was abandoned because the soil was deemed too rocky by the contractor (surprisingly, after most digging had been done), and another location with sandy soil was chosen, resulting in a cistern that did not resist flooding. Overall, approx. 100 people cannot benefit from these cisterns. Some of them expressed frustration and wish to see damaged cisterns repaired[25]. Quality issues can be traced to two main factors: 1. Because of under-quoted bids (placed to win the call for tender despite being unrealistic given the difficult access conditions to some of the cisterns), the contractors failed to meet construction standards. Some of them (e.g. in the Dora area) did not even visit the sites to assess costs before placing their bids, whereas the nature of the soil, accessibility and water availability are key factors to produce a reliable cost estimate. 2. Quality control was deficient. Construction was not supervised carefully enough to prevent the

[25] These communities currently rely on old, often distant cisterns. When these are empty, they resort to dromedaries to source and transport water from even farther. These populations can be described as extremely vulnerable to climate change.

				quality issues witnessed by the evaluators. This can be traced to: i) limited accessibility of some of the sites; and ii) the limited capacity of the PMU to control quality of such work. • 2 semi-underground sills • 900 m^3 of bank fortification After damages incurred from the May and August 2016 floods, the evaluators estimate the volume of gabions to fortify embankments at 400 m^3 in one site (to protect gardens cultivated by 3 households and approx. 20 people) and 500 m^3 in another site (contiguous to the semi-underground sills, upstream of the two micro-dams). About one quarter of the first infrastructure was damaged during a flood in summer 2019 and never repaired, which caused some frustration within the community. This is probably due to the fact that a second section of this protection, which had initially been planned and would likely have withstood the flooding, had not been built because of resource constraints. In addition, the existing section does not have underground foundations, which makes it less durable. If resources were too scarce to implement the original plan, it would have been

				advisable to re-dimension the whole protection taking hydrological assessments into account, instead of building only one section of the original design. A training workshop for the construction of gabions was built in Adailou, and will serve as headquarters for EVA. An exit strategy to capitalise on the training of 15 people for the construction of gabions should be elaborated. <u>Assamo:</u> • 1 micro-dam the micro-dam was built with gabions upstream of Assamo, in order to slow down the flow of flooding and facilitate the recharge of the aquifer. This proved efficient, as the well located just upstream of the micro-dam does not dry out as it used to be. However, the evaluators have concerns about the sustainability of this positive impact, since the 2m-high dam (completed in 2016) is now level on its upstream side with debris carried by past floods. Furthermore, the well is now only 25 cm above-ground (it used to be 1 m high in 2016) and is likely going to be submerged in coming years.

				According to the local population, this is because of more intense rainfall than in the past, a manifestation of climate change that was apparently not taken into account when designing the infrastructure. A detailed assessment of the issue and potential engineering solutions should be prepared to ensure that the impact of this infrastructure can last over time. A training workshop for the construction of gabions was built in Assamo, and is planned to be handed over to GPAA. A significant quantity of spare wire and metal cages to build gabions was also provided by the project, and could be used by the community to repair the micro-dam and/or create other infrastructures. However, it is not clear how the decisions to undertake such work will be taken in the future, as no clear local governance mechanism for the maintenance of the micro-dam was set up. • 0 cisterns • 0 semi-underground sills • 0 m^3 of bank fortification *Note: the 2019 PIR reports the construction of 28 sills overall.*

				Although the evaluators could not see that many, this reporting is credible and is confirmed by the 2017 assessment of damages caused by the May & August 2016 floods. However, the fact that these infrastructures are not in use anymore is a sign that their original design was not adequate. **Rating: moderately unsatisfactory**
	2. Percentage of total hectarage of agro-pastoralists' land which is irrigated by boreholes.	2 ha of agro-pastoral plots in Adailou (not irrigated) and 10 ha of agro- pastoral plots (not irrigated) in Assamo	30 hectares irrigated in Assamo and 30 hectares in Adailou.	Adailou: the borehole was drilled and equipped with a solar power pump, but the agro-pastoral perimeter was not created. Because the pump is not equipped with a battery, it can only function when the sky is clear, which, according to local people, is rare in the dry, winter season (i.e. when water is needed most). Contractors were hired to connect the borehole to standposts, but construction should only happen now, i.e. after the project termination. UNDP will check the quality of the installation when it is done. As per established procedures, the Direction of Water under the MAEPERH should take ownership of the borehole once UNDP has certified quality. In addition: • 8 wells were rehabilitated, further dug and protected in or nearby wadis, serving local communities for domestic needs and/or pastoralists. These wells are thus not for irrigation, and no hectarage can therefore be associated. It is estimated that

				approx. 500 people benefit from these wells. • 10 wells[26] within fenced gardens were enhanced and equipped with 10 m^3 reservoirs, irrigating a total of 2.5 ha. Strictly speaking, the Adailou area only contributes for 2.5 ha towards this indicator. *NB: Activity 2.2.1 only plans for a 10ha area, which does not match with the target. Furthermore, the target is not expressed in a unit (# ha) that matches the indicator (%).* Assamo: 18 wells were refurbished, allowing to irrigate an area of approx. 30 ha. On 10 ha agropastoral perimeter was created in Didjandee around a borehole that had previously been drilled by UNDP. Although the evaluators did not visit this plot and its creation is not mentioned in any of the annual project reports, it is reported by DEDD to benefit 30 HHs. The prodoc stated (Activity 2.1.3) that all wells should be equipped by solar-powered pumps, which was not the case. Only the Adailou borehole was equipped with a solar-power pump, and the nursery well in Adailou was equipped with a petrol-engine pump. Manual pumps were not provided either.

[26] As per the prodoc, these wells were supposed to be equipped with solar pumping, which is not the case – for budgetary reasons.

				Rating: moderately satisfactory
	3.Number of hectares of land replanted and reforested in Assamo, Adailou and Ayladou to: i) regenerate dwindling species and valued pastoral species and ii) reduce erosion.	10 ha of reforestation/re-vegetation/re-seeding activities.	70 ha in Assamo and 380 hectares in Adailou replanted and reforested.	This is not reported against in PIRs. Adailou: 0.3 ha The evaluators could not see any trace of replanting by the project, besides two patches of approx. 1,000 m^2 each in two protected area (mainly *Acacia nilotica*). Seedlings from the nursery were given to households for planting in their garden or private plots, with no demonstrated value in terms of erosion control (as the project did not have any say about the planting locations). The absence of replanting seems to have been by lack of resources and initiative from the project team, given the irrigation constraints that any replanting campaign in dry environments requires. The absence of reporting on this indicator probably impeded any corrective action. *Note: minutes from the March 2018 PSC meeting mention the planting of 800 trees in Adailou. The evaluators could not be shown these trees during their field visit.* The main restoration action (even though it is not reforestation / replanting and thus strictly speaking cannot be counted towards this target) was the protection of areas for natural revegetation. Three areas (for a total[27]

[27] This is an estimation from visual observation during field visits, as the evaluators could not use GPS to record the exact perimeters of the three areas, and no accurate information is available in project reports.

				of approx. 10,000 ha) were protected by a total of 11 eco-guards, with good success in terms of natural regeneration. The sustainability of these sites needs to be planned for. Assamo: the evaluators could see no trace of replanting. **Rating: unsatisfactory**
	4. Number of pastoral centres (pastoretums) in each region	No pastoreums in either region.	1 pastoretum in each region created.	Adailou: one pastoretum set up in a private garden to serve as training facility on the identification and culture of palatable fodder species. Assamo: as above. *NB1: the evaluators could not see traces of the two pastoretums during the field visits. This indicator is thus reported against the information provided by the project team (and supported by pictures).* *NB2: the MTE confounded the pastoral centres with nurseries, without any justification, and thus seems to have reported the same nurseries against Indicators 4 and 5.* **Rating: moderately satisfactory**

	5. Number of women's tree seedling nurseries created in both Adailou and Assamo to i) produce seeds, ii) multiply species (e.g. wind-blocking plants, fruit-bearing trees, etc.), and iii) support reforestation	1 tree nursery in Assamo (0 nurseries in Adailou)	At least 1 women's tree seedling nursery created in both Adailou and Assamo.	Adailou: a nursery was established and equipped with a well operated by a gasoil pump. However: • no women managed or worked in this nursery, which was operated by an experienced, male nursery-keeper and his male assistant; and • the nursery only provided about 30 seedlings used for reforestation, as most plants produced were for garden use. The nursery is now almost empty and practically abandoned. The continuation of the operations of this nursery and its equipment could be an opportunity, and needs to be planned for. Assamo: a nursery was established, and was used to produce mostly fruit tree seedlings. The nursery was managed by a man (member of GPAA), assisted by women. According to the nursery manager, seedlings were given for free to local people and occasional visitors. This did not allow to make the nursery profitable, as most seedlings were not sold. The nursery is now abandoned and in decay (since July 2019). This can be seen as a missed opportunity to generate additional, sustainable revenues for the community. For example, a nearby nursery visited by the evaluators produces seedlings that are sold very successfully, as far as in Djibouti-City, and generate more

				income than the sale of garden products. According to the nursery manager, the Focal Point for the Assamo area had not visited the nursery since July 2019, and was not aware of the damages. **Rating: moderately satisfactory**
	6. Creation of Catchment and Water Point Management Committees.	No Catchment Management or Water Point Management Committees exist in either Assamo or Adailou to enable the sustainable management of water use. Most diesel-powered wells have become non-functional due to the high price of diesel and the fact that there is no one with the ability to maintain the pumps locally.	5 Catchment Management Committees formed (4 in Adailou in the Weima watershed and 1 in Assamo, the Juba watershed) and 27 Water Point Committees formed in total (one around each water point). All Committees will have 4 people including 1 female representative.	2019 PIR: The project did not create new committees since they already existed at the regional level. Similarly, unformal Water Point Committees already existed. Trainings were provided and community consultations on DRM were initiated in the two regions. Trainings on watershed and water points management were provided as wells were rehabilitated. **Rating: moderately satisfactory**
Outcome 3: • improved resilience to hydrological climate change risks. • enhanced resilience to climate-mediated economic shocks through income generation and diversification	1. Number of Automatic Weather Stations (AWSs) procured and installed.	1 rain gauge in Adailou and 5 rain gauges in Assamo. No weather stations located in either zone.	One automatic weather station procured and installed in each region	Adailou: 1 automatic weather station connected to 6 rain gauges The evaluators could only see one of the rain gauges, the battery of which was dead. One of the rain gauges was removed by a local family after one of its members became sick, and the family blamed it on the "thunder-attracting" properties of the gauge. This anecdote shows the need for further awareness-raising when installing equipment unfamiliar to local populations.

				Assamo: 1 water sensor radar to provide information on flood and two rain gauges were installed. The evaluators could not check the functioning of the water sensor radar as it was locked. One of the rain gauges was broken, possibly during the construction of the tar road. The same concerns as above about the sustainability and use of the data generated by this equipment can be raised. Both sites are equipped with tele-transmitting devices that should allow data to be collected remotely. However, the phone network does not cover these areas (despite a new antenna installed in Adailou), so data needs to be retrieved directly on-site. For both sites, the main concern is the ownership of these stations after the project's termination. During the project implementation, the data was collected monthly by the project's hydrologist. However, the National Meteorological Agency that was approached to include these stations into its network and take responsibility for the maintenance would not accept unless some funding was granted by the project, which was not agreeable. As a result, these stations are currently useless and deteriorating. **Rating: moderately unsatisfactory**

	2. Number of community adaptation measures implemented to build drought or flood-resilience.	No community DRM/DRR adaptation preparedness plans.	One (1) community DRR/DRM adaptation measure implemented in each region (e.g. water point reinforcement with gabion, micro-dam de-silting).	This very vague indicator overlaps several other indicators in the RBF. Reinforcement of wells, construction of sills and micro-dams, trainings on gabion construction all count toward this target, which was thus met. **Rating: highly satisfactory**
	3. Number of rural inhabitants (disaggregated by gender and type of activity) who actively participate in bee-keeping, poultry raising	No community members are active in poultry breeding and bee-keeping.	70 households (HHs) active in poultry breeding in Assamo and 50 HHs in Adailou. 14 people in Adailou and 6 in Assamo active in beekeeping and which have been provided appropriate materials.	Adailou: no interventions were implemented to contribute to this target. Assamo: ibid. Upon request from the PSC, the construction of an educational garden was undertaken in Ali Sabieh. An area of 1 ha was walled / fenced, toilet facilities were built and a water reservoir was constructed. An agreement with the Ministry of Water was signed to connect the site to the water network. At this stage, the area is bare. Unformal discussions with the Ministry of Agriculture have been undertaken to take responsibility in the creation of the garden itself. The project contributed approx. USD 120,000 to this garden, which was not planned for in the prodoc, does not contribute to increase income through climate-resilient activities (compared to poultry), and the usefulness of which is not guaranteed in terms of climate resilience. **Rating: unsatisfactory**
	4. Number of local market stalls rehabilitated / created to facilitate	A market stall in Ali Sabieh exists but it needs to be rehabilitated and extended to	Rehabilitation of the Ali-Sabieh market stall	Tadjourah: not implemented. The 2019 PIR provides the following

	access of Adailou and Assamo farmers/cultivators/pastoralists to larger regional markets.	have a permanent structure. The market stall in Tadjourah needs to be created.	and creation of the Tadjourah market stall.	explanation: "The establishment of this market is difficult because the delivery of agricultural products from mountainous areas to Tadjourah city requires securing the transportation (buying a truck for transporting remote areas to Tadjourah or build the road) and help for the packaging (e.g. transportation cages). In addition, the budget necessary to implement the establishment of the stall has been reviewed for activities related to improving access to water which are the priority for population." This explanation and associated reassessment of priorities given budgetary constraints can be supported; however, the RBF should have been changed when this budget reallocation was decided. Although this change was not done, the evaluators will take into account the justification in the PIR to rate this target achievement. Ali Sabieh: the market was rehabilitated by a project partner (Djiboutian Agency of Social Development) through another project. Therefore, the LDCF 3 project could not intervene nor contributed to this rehabilitation and budget was reallocated. **Rating: moderately satisfactory**
	5. % change in revenue to artisanal activities, poultry-breeding, bee-keeping and	Only limited and irregular sales of guava in Assamo. No sales of products in Adailou. No participation of community members in	% change in revenue for community members (including % increase in supply of eggs, chicken,	Bee-keeping and poultry-breeding activities have not been conducted. No data is available to assess any income increase from nursery sales,

	nursery sales (disaggregated by gender).	livelihood diversification measures in either region.	honey, nursery seedlings and gabion) - disaggregated by gender.	but such income is expected to be minimal (seedlings produced in both Adailou and Assamo nurseries were mostly given away to community members and visitor). **Rating: highly unsatisfactory**

Rating: moderately satisfactory

Relevance (*)

As shown in Section IV.A, the project's planned interventions are absolutely relevant to the Djiboutian climate change context, characterised by decreasing water availability, higher temperatures and increased frequency of extreme weather events leading to a higher risk of natural disasters (flash floods, dry spells). The occurrence of such phenomena during the project implementation (2016 and 2019 floods in the Adailou area) have proven that the intervention strategy is adequate.

However, some of the project activities were not tailored to the local and regional contexts and had to be redesigned (support to water management committees instead of the creation of new ones) or abandoned (creation of retention ponds).

Other observations on the relevance of the project interventions pertain to new activities that had not initially been planned, activities that were not implemented adequately and planned activities that were not conducted.

- The relevance of the educative garden in Ali Sabieh, which was not planned for in the original design, and was an *ad-hoc* demand from the Government of Djibouti, is not clear. Once it is completed, this garden could theoretically serve adaptation purposes as a demonstration facility for climate-resilient market gardening practices, for example. However, the destination of the garden was not clear at the time of evaluation, and no guarantee of its usefulness in the perspective of resilience currently exists. Moreover, given the completion of the project, it is unsure how trainings on the demonstration plot will be financed and who will be the beneficiaries.
- The design and construction of semi-underground sills, micro-dams and other water protection infrastructures were not totally adequate, in that they did not take into account changing climate conditions and failed to abide by best construction standards. The evaluators note that this is paradoxical in the context of a project focused on climate resilience. For example, sills had not been designed to withstand decennial floods, two of which occurred during the project implementation and damages many of the project's infrastructures. Similarly, some of the cisterns in the Adailou area were not built up to construction standards (by lack of resources and supervision), and are therefore out of order.
- A number of relevant planned activities have not been implemented, mostly by lack of resources. This is discussed in Section IV.B and Table 11.

Rating: relevant

Effectiveness & Efficiency (*)

- Effectiveness

  Effectiveness refers to whether expected results were achieved given allocated resources. Progress at project closure towards the results measured by indicators is described in Table 11. The overall assessment is that, even though many activities were not conducted as initially described in the prodoc, the project nevertheless contributed towards the overarching objective, namely the "reduction of climate-related vulnerabilities facing the inhabitants of mountainous regions of Djibouti through institutional strengthening, climate-smart water management and targeted investment".

  The fact that several activities were not conducted as planned and that some targets were not met is due to three main reasons:

- as analysed in Section IV.A, the intervention framework was overly ambitious – in terms of the number and scale of interventions – given: i) the project budget; and ii) the Djiboutian context, characterised by the limited capacity of many project partners and contractors;
- in addition to the point above, some indicators and targets are not appropriate, in that they do not match the outputs that could be expected from planned activities, they are not realistic, and/or they are difficult to measure; moreover, the MTE failed to analyse this and suggest appropriate amendments; and
- some inefficiencies hampered project implementation, which are further analysed below.

- Efficiency

In terms of project execution, the use of project resources was efficient, thanks to a reduced but dynamic PMU. This is in contrast to initiatives with comparable budget in Djibouti, but with a much larger PMU. In addition, partnerships established with local organisations (EVA, GPAA) facilitated community engagement and were efficient platforms for the implementation of some activities (gabion construction, market gardening). Efforts were also made to coordinate with other projects and avoid duplication of activities.

The main source of inefficiency in terms of use of project resources was the poor design of water protection infrastructures, which had to be repaired or rebuilt at great expenses. Several infrastructures were also abandoned after they were damaged, since they could not be repaired. Damaged cisterns in the Dora area that cannot serve their purpose in their current state of decay can also be considered as wasted resources, as long as they are not repaired. Finally, the provision of petrol-powered pumps was also a poor choice in terms of efficiency, since petrol needs to be procured on a regular basis, at cost, or the pumps will not work. In addition, these pumps broke down several times and had to be replaced, since no capacity or parts for reparation were available. In this context, the hydrologist consultant for the project advised to group procurement for such material between projects, and include specific requirements in the terms of reference for the availability of repairing capacity in Djibouti-City. A short but useful document detailing this advice was produced by the consultant, and is annexed to this report for future reference (Annex 9, in French).

Rating:
- **effectiveness: moderately satisfactory**
- **efficiency: moderately unsatisfactory**

Country ownership

Country ownership is generally satisfactory. The NIM implementation modality fostered ownership of the project by the MHUE in particular. The revitalisation of the NCCC and local partnerships built with EVA and GPAA also participated to country ownership. The three limits below can nevertheless be mentioned.

- Refusals – supposedly by lack of capacity[28] – by the National Institute of Statistics to collaborate to baseline surveys are a sign that some national institutions will not cooperate with initiatives that clearly match their mandates if: i) they are not consulted and involved early during project formulation and implementation; and ii) no financial resources are made available to support their involvement. Future projects will need to take this dimension into account, or they will face the risk of not being able to work with the relevant partners.
- Devolution is a relatively new process in Djibouti and regional institutions still have limited capacity to participate actively to project implementation and supervision. In particular, prefectures and regional councils would need to be better involved in project formulation for future initiatives, and continue to be systematically updated on project progress during implementation. In this respect, sending out invitations to PSC meetings is not quite sufficient, as regional representatives typically receive many such invitations and cannot honour them all. An alternative solution could be the dissemination of a short, illustrated quarterly newsletter documenting project progress.
- Finally, it seems that the execution partner did not feel totally compelled by the project document. Even though it would be inappropriate to mention an excess of country ownership, it should be reminded that the project document is theoretically a binding document, and that any changes that the execution partner could suggest would need to be documented and justified, which the evaluators did not always find proofs of.

Mainstreaming

- Mainstreaming in UNDP strategic priorities

The project is well aligned with UNDP strategic priorities as expressed in:

  - the Country Programme for Djibouti (2018-2022): outcomes "Strengthened livelihoods and access to basic health services", "Environmental sustainability and climate resilience" and "Enabling and inclusive governance framework for sustainable development";
  - UNDP's Strategic Plan 2018-2021: signature solutions 1: "Keeping people out of poverty"; 2: "Strengthen effective, inclusive and accountable governance"; and 3: "Enhance national prevention and recovery capacities for resilient societies"; and
  - the *Plan Cadre des Nations Unies pour l'Aide au Développement (PNUAD) de la République de Djibouti 2018-2022*: outcomes 1: "employment opportunities"; 4: "protection of vulnerable people"; 6: "good governance"; 7: "resilience of communities"; and 8: "sustainable development of regions".

- Mainstreaming in the national context

The project is perfectly aligned with the main national strategic document, namely Vision 2035 Djibouti. The main achievement of the project in terms of mainstreaming is the design and validation of the National Climate Change Strategy (NCCS). The NCCS was produced through a participatory process involving governmental and non-governmental stakeholders. It was validated by the newly-revitalised NCCC on 29 April 2018, and has since been used as a national reference by policymakers and practitioners.

As described in Table 11, a roadmap for the establishment of a national Fund for the Environment and Climate Change is being prepared. The evaluators did not have access to the document as it has not

[28] By lack of time, the evaluators could not interview representatives from these two institutions. This would have been useful to triangulate information received from the PMU.

been finalised yet. Some concerns have been expressed by national stakeholders from DEDD about the relevance of this initiative – they argue that Djibouti is not ready to operate such a fund – and the processes that: i) lead to its integration into the intervention strategy at the formulation phase, as this was allegedly a strong suggestion from UNDP and not a demand from the country; and ii) is ongoing for the drafting of the roadmap, as UNDP allegedly did not consult the MHUE on the selection of the international consultant in charge. This international consultant is not French-speaking, and has apparently not liaised with the PMU (when it was still in place) before starting their consultations. Another concern is the possible reorientation of the Fund towards supporting not only environmental and climate change-related initiatives, but also other causes such as entrepreneurship. Efforts should be made by this consultant and UNDP to include national parties – in particular DEDD – as much as possible in the elaboration phase of this roadmap – as opposed to only seeking national validation once the draft is produced. This will facilitate country ownership of the future Fund and its mainstreaming into the national landscape of climate action.

Finally, a value chain development strategy for poultry and bee keeping was formulated, but not implemented as resources ran out to conduct related activities under Component 3.
Note: the assessment produced in January 2017 on damages to the water protection infrastructures in Adailou contains valuable information on best practices for the design and construction of such infrastructures. This document should serve a basis for the development of updated national guidelines for the design and construction of water protection infrastructures, that will benefit many other present and future initiatives.

Sustainability (*)

Sustainability of the project's results has been a key focus of the evaluators' visits and interviews. Table below analyses the probability of the sustainability of the main project's results.

Table 12. Critical analysis of the sustainability likelihood of the main project results.

Project results	Observations on sustainability & recommendations	Sustainability likelihood rating
Revitalisation of the NCCC	This is one of the main achievement of the projects. The NCCC has been gathering on an ad hoc basis on numerous occasions since its re-creation, and the decree formalising its existence and mandate is due to be approved soon. The NCCC has benefit from several trainings under this project and the GCF Readiness programme. The two concerns below can be raised as to the sustainability of the NCCC's activities. • Some members have shown reluctance to attend meetings without financial compensation (in addition to per diems), which is arguably not a legitimate request when they are already public servants. The decree should clarify meeting conditions to avoid any further debate on this point. • Because of the limited number of stakeholders that have the capacity and interest to be involved on climate-related matters, the same people may be called to gather twice or thrice a month through the NCCC, for matters pertaining to policy-making, training or project validation. This could eventually create meeting fatigue and erode the motivation of concerned stakeholders. Besides the longer-term increase of national capacity on climate matters, a potential solution to ward off this risk is to streamline meeting agendas and regroup agenda items in common meeting sessions.	Likely
Water protection infrastructures	Some water protection infrastructures were destroyed during project implementation, and others show significant weaknesses and signs of wear. As discussed in other sections, this is because of inadequate construction standards and poor initial design that did not properly take climate events into accounts. The long-term sustainability of these infrastructures is highly unlikely (see for example Picture 2 in Annex 4). A	Moderately likely in the short term; moderately unlikely in the longer term

	second-best solution the extend the lifespan of these infrastructures is for communities to repair and / or raise them periodically. The project procured extra gabion materials and left them for the communities' use. In addition, local community members were trained on the construction of gabions, so they would theoretically be able to undertake such reinforcement work – though probably not autonomously (as beneficiaries expressed their need for additional technical support on the construction of gabion).	
Wells, boreholes	Wells that were rehabilitated were adequately protected to minimise the risk of pollution or damages from floods. One caveat is the sustainability of the well upstream of the micro-dam in Assamo, which is likely to be covered with sediments and rocks in the coming two to three years if it is not raised higher. One gasoil pump was procured for the nursery well in Adailou, and already had to be replaced twice. In addition, the community could not always source gasoil to run the pump. This is obviously not a sustainable solution, and solar-powered pumps should be systematically favoured when feasible. In addition, the hydrology consultant suggested to consolidate call for tenders for pumps across several projects and insert into the ToRs the obligation for the contractor to establish a repair workshop in Djibouti with spare parts, so that damaged equipment could be easily fixed. In theory, water points and associated equipment are supposed to be handed over to the Direction for Large Works under the MAEPERH for maintenance.	Likely
Cisterns	Several cisterns installed are already damaged, or have not received any water since they were built. It is unlikely that the Direction for Large Works will have the resources to repair these cisterns. The durability of functioning cisterns is difficult to assess at this stage.	Moderately likely
AWSs	As described in other sections, some of the gauges have already been destroyed. Others do not have any live battery. Tele-transmission is not effective because of the	Unlikely

	absence of adequate phone network. At this stage, the only foreseeable solution would be for the NMA to source the funds to include these stations into its network and proceed to necessary maintenance.	
Gabion workshops	The buildings were handed over the EVA and GPAA to use as their own facilities. Trained community members will retain their ability to build gabions for some time. Opportunities to market this competence would need to be identified. For example, future projects could contract the workshops to produce gabion cages and create water protection infrastructure. This would be a significant source of income for local youths in particular. However, additional technical support and training were deemed necessary by the project beneficiaries to be able to run the workshop on their own.	Moderately likely
Nurseries	The Assamo nursery is empty and decayed, and only the metal structure remains. There seems to be no intention to restore it and use it again. The Adailou nursery is in relatively good shape, and the assistant to the nursery-keeper acquired the competence to operate it. There would thus be a case for developing a business plan for this nursery, which could not only provide seedlings to nearby communities, but also to future projects in the area. This would be facilitated by the upcoming construction of the new tar road between Adailou and the National Road.	Moderately unlikely
Market gardens	Market gardens established in Adailou are functioning well, and providing substantial income to local households. Trainings were provided, exchange visits with Assamo cooperative members were organised and the diversity of species grown limits the risk associated with mono-culture.	Likely
Educative garden	Initial discussions were held with MAEPERH to connect the fenced area to the Ali Sabieh water network. However, the MAEPERH did not follow up, and the	Moderately unlikely

	PMU turned to ONEAD[29]. At the time of the TE, water had not been connected, and no specific plans to set up the garden itself had been designed. The sustainability of this output is thus highly questionable.	

Rating:

- financial resources: moderately unlikely
- socio-political: moderately likely
- institutional framework and governance: moderately likely
- environmental: moderately likely
- **overall: moderately likely**

[29] National Agency for Water and Sanitation Djibouti (Office National de l'Eau et de l'Assainissement Djibouti)

Impact (*)

Despite several shortcomings described in the sections above, the project's impact on the resilience of mountain population can be deemed significant, even though sustainability is questionable (see previous section). The most impactful measures implemented are the rehabilitation and protection of water points, and income-generating activities (market gardening, production of gabions). Numerous training sessions were organised, that increased the capacity of local communities to cope with the adverse impacts of climate change by strengthening the resilience of their livelihoods and protecting assets from floods.

In addition, the revitalisation of the NCCC, validation of the NCCS and future establishment of the Fund for the Environment and Climate Change will be stepping stones for the continued action of the Government of Djibouti towards adaptation to climate change.

The impact – and sustainability of this impact – could have been significantly higher if construction best practices had been followed (for cisterns and water protection infrastructures), relevant partners had been approached and involved from the onset (e.g. the National Office of Statistics), planned livelihood-supporting activities had been conducted, and training in marketing and strengthening of value chains has been provided to the beneficiary cooperatives.

Rating: significant

VI. CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS & LESSONS

Despite an original design that was generally sound and significant achievement towards its overarching objective to reduce the climate vulnerability of rural communities in mountainous regions of Djibouti, the project suffered from a number of shortcomings that reduce its current and future impacts. These are: i) i) the non-implementation of 18% of the project planned activities/ sub-activities without clear, sound and documented justification, which may have affected the project intervention strategy and the achievement of at least two ouputs; ii) insufficient investment in M&E, which did not allow for relevant revisions of the results-based framework; and iii) execution difficulties in terms of procurement and supervision of construction activities.

Key observations, lessons learned and recommendations are formulated below.

Actions to follow up or reinforce initial benefits from the project[30]

The suggested actions below mainly focus on strengthening the sustainability of key project outputs.

- The handover of a number of infrastructures needs to be organised with the relevant institutions, not only to respect national procedures, but also to ensure the maintenance of these infrastructures: Adailou borehole, Adailou nursery, automatic weather stations, educative garden, gabion workshops.
- As operational implementation of the project officially terminated, supervision of remaining on-the-ground activities needs to be organised between DEDD and UNDP. Activities include: i) completion of the educative garden; and ii) connection of the Adailou borehole to standposts.
- Some infrastructures and equipment are already damaged and require maintenance, namely AWSs in Adailou and Assamo, and cisterns in the Dora area. Other infrastructures are threatened and need to be elevated and/or strengthened before they become out-of-repair. These include: i) the micro-dam in Assamo and the well upstream; and ii) the gabion wall protecting market garden in Adailou. Ideally, additional training could be given to local communities so that they can organise themselves and repair these infrastructures.
- In terms of governance, strengthening the technical capacity and streamlining the agenda of the NCCC will allow to avoid meeting fatigue and strengthen the NCCC's workstream.

Proposals for future directions underlining main objectives

The following recommendations would strengthen the impact of future initiatives contributing to a similar objective as the evaluated project.

- Limiting site dispersion to facilitate project execution.
- In the context of the national devolution policy, involvement of regional authorities would need to be strengthened. In this respect, sending out invitations to PSC meetings is not quite sufficient, as regional representatives typically receive many such invitations and cannot honour them all. An alternative solution could be the dissemination of a short, illustrated quarterly newsletter documenting project progress, along with systematic courtesy visits when the project team is on site.
- The assessment[31] produced in January 2017 on damages to the water protection infrastructures in Adailou contains valuable information on best practices for the design and construction of such infrastructures. This document should serve a basis for the development of updated

[30] The template for the TE report presented in the ToRs included a section "Corrective actions for the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the project", which applies to MTEs, and, by definition, not to TEs.

[31] Compagnie D'Aménagement des Coteaux de Gascogne. January 2017. Bassin versant de l'oued de Weima. Diagnostic hydraulique et structurel des sites d'Adaylou, Abahloïta et Guemellou

national guidelines for the design and construction of water protection infrastructures, that will benefit many other present and future initiatives.

Best and worst practices in addressing issues relating to relevance, performance and success

Best and worst practices described below should be seen as lessons learned for future initiatives.

- In terms of execution, the evaluators noted that 18% of the activities/ sub-activities included in the project document were not implemented and a new activity was added (see Section B, p. 40). As a result, Outputs 2.3 and 3.2 were not delivered, and the overall impact of the project in terms of resilience strengthening of vulnerable communities will be inferior to what could be expected.
- With this regards, it is recommended as best practice to keep written statements of all changes made in the project framework and activities: written statements – like minutes of steering committees – should be kept by the project team, provide clear explaination of the changes made in the project, and of the validation process during the steering committees.
- Climate change absolutely needs to be taken into account when designing protection infrastructure. Out of 16 dams and sills constructed, only 6 were still functional at the time of the TE, and one is likely going to be overflown by debris in coming years. This is because of original designs were only calibrated to take into account: i) floods of a recurrence period inferior to 10 years; and ii) current climate conditions, as opposed to anticipated, changing climate. In this perspective, the IGAD/ICPAC study on downscaled climate change projections conducted in 2018 for this project should inform the design of future infrastructures[32].
- Communication between the central PMU and local staff (FP) needs to be strengthened, for exemple with calls or meetings organised every week.
- Partnerships with Civil Society Organisations were a significant innovation by the project, and should be continued in future projects. To enhance the effectiveness of these partnerships, capacity-building efforts could be made to ensure that prospective civil society partners have a clear understanding of roles, responsibilities and procurement processes.
- Establishing strong partnership with relevant institutions from project onset is necessary to ensure ownership of project activities by the appropriate institutions at project end.
- The DEDD adequately organises field visits for prospective construction work bidders, so that the actual conditions of the work (including transportation costs of equipment and material) can be reflected in their offers. All efforts should be made to encourage prospective bidders to participate to these field visits; this is all the more important to ensure delivery quality in remote project sites.
- Hiring an expert to support the PMU, or a pool of experts with knowledge in project management and reporting (national or international), would be useful for technical backstopping, quality control of project deliverables and M&E.

[32] H.S. Endris. 2018. Downscaling Coarse Resolution Climate Projections for Djibouti.

ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE

BASIC INFORMATON

Location:	*Djibouti*
Application Deadline:	
Type of Contract:	*Individual Contract*
Post Level:	*International and national consultant*
Languages Required:	*English/French*
Starting (date when the selected candidate is expected to start)	*30/11/2019*
Expected Duration of Assignment:	30 days

BACKGROUND

INTRODUCTION

In accordance with UNDP and GEF M&E policies and procedures, all full and medium-sized UNDP support GEF financed projects are required to undergo a terminal evaluation upon completion of implementation. These terms of reference (TOR) sets out the expectations for a Terminal Evaluation (TE) of the Supporting rural community adaptation to climate change in mountainous regions of Djibouti (PIMS 51 89)

The essentials of the project to be evaluated are as follows:

PROJECT SUMMARY TABLE

Project Title:	The Supporting rural community adaptation to climate change in mountainous regions of Djibouti			
GEF Project ID:	51 89		*at endorsement (Million US$)*	*at completion (Million US$)*
UNDP Project ID:	00079962	GEF financing:	5, 379, 452	5, 379, 452
Country:	Djibouti	IA/EA own:		
Region:	Djibouti Ali-Sabieh and Tadjourah	Government:	Ministry on Habitat Urbanism and the Environment	Ministry on Habitat Urbanism and the Environment
Focal Area:		Other:		
FA Objectives, (OP/SP):		Total co-financing:	5, 379, 452	5, 379, 452
Executing Agency:	Ministry on Habitat Urbanism and the Environment	Total Project Cost:	5, 379 ,452	5, 379, 452
Other Partners involved:		ProDoc Signature (date project began):		2014
		(Operational) Closing Date:	Proposed:	Actual:

OBJECTIVE AND SCOPE

As climate change evolves, and floods and droughts become more severe and frequent in Djibouti, there is a need to find approaches that can reduce the sensitivity of farmers and pastoralists to increasing rainfall variability. Impacts from

erratic rainfall are intensified in upland regions, where severe flood events cause significant erosion and damage to livelihoods. At the national level, the absence of a national climate change strategy and institutional mechanisms to promote cross-sectoral/cross-ministerial coordination and to mobilise funds hampers efforts to address long-term climate-related risks in rural regions. At regional and local levels, particularly in remote mountain regions, communities lack the financial, technical and informational resources needed to build their resilience to climate change as well as the knowledge of how to prepare for extreme weather impacts.

This project will support the reactivation of the National Climate Change Committee to coordinate cross-sectoral actions and to ensure effective use of resources and generation of co-benefits for activities supporting adaptation to climate change. At the regional (sub-national) level, the project will be used to develop targeted drought and flood preparedness plans and to build capacity to support disaster risk management and reduction. At the local level, the project will reduce the vulnerability of rural mountain populations to climate change by mobilizing and storing surface and groundwater resources, diversifying livelihoods, enabling access to markets, and reducing erosion through reforestation and re-vegetation. Local-level activities will be facilitated by strong coordination with locally-based NGOs/CSOs. In conjunction with other ongoing initiatives of relevance outlined in this project document, LDCF resources are expected to enhance the adaptive capacity of vulnerable populations in Djibouti to respond to extreme weather events as well as to facilitate long-term climate-resilient development and preparedness planning at the national and regional levels.

The TE will be conducted according to the guidance, rules and procedures established by UNDP and GEF as reflected in the UNDP Evaluation Guidance for GEF Financed Projects.
The objectives of the evaluation are to assess the achievement of project results, and to draw lessons that can both improve the sustainability of benefits from this project, and aid in the overall enhancement of UNDP programming.

EVALUATION APPROACH AND METHOD

An overall approach and method[33] for conducting project terminal evaluations of UNDP supported GEF financed projects has developed over time. The evaluator is expected to frame the evaluation effort using the criteria of **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and impact,** as defined and explained in the UNDP Guidance for Conducting Terminal Evaluations of UNDP-supported, GEF-financed Projects. The evaluator must complete the questions and submit this matrix as part of an initial evaluation report and include it as an appendix to the final report (*fill in Annex C*).
The evaluation must provide evidence-based information that is credible, reliable and useful. The evaluator is expected to follow a participatory and consultative approach ensuring close engagement with government counterparts, in particular the GEF operational focal point, UNDP Country Office, project team, UNDP GEF Technical Adviser based in the region and key stakeholders. The evaluator is expected to conduct a field mission to Aidalou and Assamo sites. Interviews will be held with the following organizations and individuals at a minimum:

Ministry on Habitat, Urbanism and the Environment (MHUE);
Ministry of Agriculture, Water, Fisheries, Animal Husbandry and Marine Resources (MAEPERH);
State Secretariat for Solidarity;
Ministry of Interior through the Executive Secretariat for Risk and Disaster Management;
Ministry of Budget;
Ministry for the Promotion of Women;
EVA (Village Ecology of Adailou);
Agricultural Cooperative of Assamo;
Center for Research Studies of Djibouti;
State Secretariat for Social Affairs.

The evaluator will review all relevant sources of information, such as the project document, project reports – including Annual APR/PIR, project budget revisions, midterm review, progress reports, GEF focal area tracking tools, project files, national strategic and legal documents, and any other materials that the evaluator considers useful for this

[33] For additional information on methods, see the Handbook on Planning, Monitoring and Evaluating for Development Results, Chapter 7, pg. 163

evidence-based assessment. A list of documents that the project team will provide to the evaluator for review is included in Annex B of this Terms of Reference.

EVALUATION CRITERIA & RATINGS

An assessment of project performance will be carried out, based against expectations set out in the Project Logical Framework/Results Framework (see Annex A), which provides performance and impact indicators for project implementation along with their corresponding means of verification. The evaluation will at a minimum cover the criteria of: **relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and impact.** Ratings must be provided on the following performance criteria. The completed table must be included in the evaluation executive summary. The obligatory rating scales are included in Annex D.

Evaluation Ratings:			
1. Monitoring and Evaluation	***rating***	**2. IA& EA Execution**	***rating***
M&E design at entry		Quality of UNDP Implementation	
M&E Plan Implementation		Quality of Execution - Executing Agency	
Overall quality of M&E		Overall quality of Implementation / Execution	
3. Assessment of Outcomes	**rating**	**4. Sustainability**	**rating**
Relevance		Financial resources:	
Effectiveness		Socio-political:	
Efficiency		Institutional framework and governance:	
Overall Project Outcome Rating		Environmental:	
		Overall likelihood of sustainability:	

PROJECT FINANCE / COFINANCE

The Evaluation will assess the key financial aspects of the project, including the extent of co-financing planned and realized. Project cost and funding data will be required, including annual expenditures. Variances between planned and actual expenditures will need to be assessed and explained. Results from recent financial audits, as available, should be taken into consideration. The evaluator(s) will receive assistance from the Country Office (CO) and Project Team to obtain financial data in order to complete the co-financing table below, which will be included in the terminal evaluation report.

Co-financing (type/source)	UNDP own financing (mill. US$)		Government (mill. US$)		Partner Agency (mill. US$)		Total (mill. US$)	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Actual	Actual
Grants								
Loans/Concessions								
• In-kind support								
• Other								
Totals								

MAINSTREAMING

UNDP supported GEF financed projects are key components in UNDP country programming, as well as regional and global programmes. The evaluation will assess the extent to which the project was successfully mainstreamed with other UNDP priorities, including poverty alleviation, improved governance, the prevention and recovery from natural disasters, and gender.

IMPACT

The evaluators will assess the extent to which the project is achieving impacts or progressing towards the achievement of impacts. Key findings that should be brought out in the evaluations include whether the project has demonstrated: a)

verifiable improvements in ecological status, b) verifiable reductions in stress on ecological systems, and/or c) demonstrated progress towards these impact achievements.[34]

CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS & LESSONS

The evaluation report must include a chapter providing a set of **conclusions**, **recommendations** and **lessons**.

IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS

The principal responsibility for managing this evaluation resides with the UNDP CO in Djibouti. The UNDP CO will contract the evaluators and ensure the timely provision of per diems and travel arrangements within the country for the evaluation team. The Project Team will be responsible for liaising with the Evaluators team to set up stakeholder interviews, arrange field visits, coordinate with the Government etc.

EVALUATION TIMEFRAME

The total duration of the evaluation will be 30 days according to the following plan:

Activity	Timing	Completion Date
Preparation	*4* days	
Evaluation Mission	*14* days	
Draft Evaluation Report	*10* days	
Final Report	*2* days	

EVALUATION DELIVERABLES

The evaluation team is expected to deliver the following:

Deliverable	Content	Timing	Responsibilities
Inception Report	Evaluator provides clarifications on timing and method	No later than 2 weeks before the evaluation mission.	Evaluator submits to UNDP CO
Presentation	Initial Findings	End of evaluation mission	To project management, UNDP CO
Draft Final Report	Full report, (per annexed template) with annexes	Within 3 weeks of the evaluation mission	Sent to CO, reviewed by RTA, PCU, GEF OFPs
Final Report*	Revised report	Within 1 week of receiving UNDP comments on draft	Sent to CO for uploading to UNDP ERC.

*When submitting the final evaluation report, the evaluator is required also to provide an 'audit trail', detailing how all received comments have (and have not) been addressed in the final evaluation report.

TEAM COMPOSITION

The evaluation team will be composed of 1 international and 1 national evaluators. The consultants shall have prior experience in evaluating similar projects. Experience with GEF financed projects is an advantage. The international consultant will be responsible for finalizing the report. The evaluators selected should not have participated in the project preparation and/or implementation and should not have conflict of interest with project related activities.

The Team members must present the following qualifications:

[34]A useful tool for gauging progress to impact is the Review of Outcomes to Impacts (ROtI) method developed by the GEF Evaluation Office: ROTI Handbook 2009

For international consultant

- Minimum 7 years of relevant professional experience;

For national consultant

- Minimum 5 years of relevant professional experience;

For both

- Knowledge of UNDP and GEF ;
- Previous experience with results-based monitoring and evaluation methodologies;
- Technical knowledge in the targeted focal area(s);
- Excellent communication skills;
- Demonstrable analytical skills;
- Project review experiences within United Nations system will be considered an asset;
- Experience with evaluating similar GEF financed projects is an advantage.
- Demonstrated understanding of issues related to gender;

EVALUATOR ETHICS

Evaluation consultants will be held to the highest ethical standards and are required to sign a Code of Conduct (Annex E) upon acceptance of the assignment. UNDP evaluations are conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the UNEG 'Ethical Guidelines for Evaluations'

PAYMENT MODALITIES AND SPECIFICATIONS

%	Milestone
	At contract signing
	Following submission and approval of the 1ST draft terminal evaluation report
	Following submission and approval (UNDP-CO and UNDP RTA) of the final terminal evaluation report

APPLICATION PROCESS

Applicants are requested to apply online (indicate the site, such as http://jobs.undp.org, etc.) by (date). Individual consultants are invited to submit applications together with their CV for these positions. The application should contain a current and complete C.V. in English (Spanish in LAC, French in Francophone Africa, etc.) with indication of the e-mail and phone contact. Shortlisted candidates will be requested to submit a price offer indicating the total cost of the assignment (including daily fee, per diem and travel costs).

UNDP applies a fair and transparent selection process that will take into account the competencies/skills of the applicants as well as their financial proposals. Qualified women and members of social minorities are encouraged to apply.

ANNEX A: PROJECT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

See the project document Page 79

ANNEX B: LIST OF DOCUMENTS TO BE REVIEWED BY THE EVALUATORS

- GEF Project Information Form (PIF), Project Document, and Log Frame Analysis (LFA);
- Project Implementation Plan;
- Implementing/Executing partner arrangements;
- List and contact details for project staff, key project stakeholders, including Project Boards, and other partners to be consulted;
- Project sites, highlighting suggested visits;
- The country's national strategy document;
- The paper on the country's long-term vision (Vision Djibouti 2035);
- Lessons Learned Report;
- Mid Term Review (MTE) Report;
- Annual Project Implementation (APR/PIR) Reports;
- Project budget and financial data;
- Project Tracking Tool, at baseline, at mid-term, and at terminal points;
- UNDP Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF);
- UNDP Country Programme Document (CPD);
- GEF focal area strategic program objectives.

ANNEX C: EVALUATION QUESTIONS

This is a generic list, to be further detailedwith more specific questions by CO and UNDP GEF Technical Adviser based on the particulars of the project.

Evaluative CriteriaQuestions	Indicators	Sources	Methodology
Relevance: How does the project relate to the main objectives of the GEF focal area, and to the environment and development priorities at the local, regional and national levels?			
•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•
Effectiveness: To what extent have the expected outcomes and objectives of the project been achieved?			
•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•
•		•	•
Efficiency: Was the project implemented efficiently, in-line with international and national norms and standards?			
•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•
Sustainability: To what extent are there financial, institutional, social-economic, and/or environmental risks to sustaining long-term project results?			
•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•
Impact: Are there indications that the project has contributed to, or enabled progress toward, reduced environmental stress and/or improved ecological status?			
•	•	•	•
•	•	•	•

ANNEX D: RATING SCALES

Ratings for Outcomes, Effectiveness, Efficiency, M&E, I&E Execution	***Sustainability ratings:***	***Relevance ratings***
6: Highly Satisfactory (HS): no shortcomings 5: Satisfactory (S): minor shortcomings 4: Moderately Satisfactory (MS) 3. Moderately Unsatisfactory (MU): significant shortcomings 2. Unsatisfactory (U): major problems 1. Highly Unsatisfactory (HU): severe problems	4. Likely (L): negligible risks to sustainability 3. Moderately Likely (ML):moderate risks 2. Moderately Unlikely (MU): significant risks 1. Unlikely (U): severe risks	2. Relevant (R) 1.. Not relevant (NR) ***Impact Ratings:*** 3. Significant (S) 2. Minimal (M) 1. Negligible (N)
Additional ratings where relevant: Not Applicable (N/A) Unable to Assess (U/A		

ANNEX 2: ITINERARY

	Activities
Thursday 9 January 2020	
2 pm – 4.30 pm	UNDSS briefing; meeting with UNDP Climate change & Environment team; interview with DEDD Deputy Director of DEDD Meeting with the project team to prepare field visits
Friday 10 January 2020	
7 am – 4 pm	Departure to Adailou, Tadjourah region Adailou: briefing with the PFC for the region, visit of gabion workshop, cisterns, sills, micro-dams and protected area for natural regeneration. Meeting with Village Chief. Night in Tadjourah
Saturday 11 January 2020	
7 am – 4 pm	Visits in Adailou area (incl. Gaoura area): cisterns, wells, nursery, gardens, AWS, protected area for natural regeneration Interviews with nursery assistant and local communities Night in Tadjourah
Sunday 12 January 2020	
7 am – 4 pm	Visits in Adailou area (incl. Esaylou): cisterns, borehole Interviews with local communities Night in Tadjourah
Monday 13 January 2020	
7.30 am – 4 pm	Departure to Ali Sabieh Interview with President of the Regional Council of the Ali Sabieh region Travel to Assamo, visits: wells, gabion workshop, nursery, AWS, cooperative garden Ali Sabieh: visit of educative garden Night in Ali Sabieh
Tuesday 14 January 2020	
8. am – 4.30 pm	Departure to Djibouti-Ville Interview with Project Manager
Wednesday 15 January 2020	
11.30 am – 5 pm	Interviews with MAEPERH Focal Point and UNDP Climate Change & Environment Coordinator

Thursday 16 January 2020	
8.30 am – 5 pm	Presentation of preliminary evaluation results at DEDD Interviews with MHUE Secretary General and UNDP Climate Change & Environment Coordinator

ANNEX 3: LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED

Name	Position
Idriss Ismael Nour	Deputy Director at DEED, MHUE
Hibo Mohamed	Junior Expert, Climate change & Environment Team, UNDP
Idris Bexi	Coordinator, Climate change & Environment Team, UNDP
Kabir Hamad	Regional Focal Point, Adailou
Hamad Houmed	Project Administrative & Financial Officer
M. Karim	Village Chief, Adailou
	Assistant to the nursery manager, Adailou
	Local community members, Adailou area
	President of the Regional Council of Ali Sabieh region
Kash Bash	GPAA founder & member, Assamo
	Nursery manager, Assamo
	Guard of the gabion workshop, Assamo
	Local community members, Assamo
Aïcha Ahmed Ali	Project Manager
Mohamed Abdellah Haman	MAEPRH Focal Point
Dini Abdallah Omar	MHUE Secretary General

ANNEX 4: SUMMARY OF FIELD VISITS

1. Presentation of preliminary results of the evaluation after the field mission (in French)

Appui à l'adaptation aux changements climatiques des communautés rurales dans les régions montagneuses de Djibouti

Evaluation Terminale - Session de restitution

Résultats préliminaires

16 janvier 2020

Dr Marie-Ange Baudoin, Pierre Bégat

MHUE fem UNDP

1. Contexte de la présentation des résultats préliminaires

- Présentation au terme de la mission du 09-16/01/2020
- Régions et sites visités :
  - Région d'Adailou: sites d'Adailou, Dora, Gawara, Dafeynatou et Adoyla
  - Région d'Ali Sabieh: sites d'Ali Sabieh et Assamo

⇒ Résultats préliminaires présentés **uniquement pour une sélection des catégories de revue** : conception du projet, mise en œuvre, résultats, et conclusions préliminaires

2. Conception du projet

➢ *Pertinence stratégique*

Le projet a comme objectif principal de réduire la vulnérabilité des populations rurales au manque d'eau de plus en plus fréquent dans le contexte des changements climatiques, au sein de 2 zones montagneuses de Djibouti

- **Cohérence avec les priorités environnementales nationales :**
  - le projet est en adéquation avec les priorités soulignées dans le **Programme d'Action National d'Adaptation (PANA)**
  - **Cohérence avec les priorités du PNUD et du FEM :**
  - le projet est cohérent avec les Résultats Primaire et Secondaire du Plan Stratégique du PNUD: réduire les risques de désastres naturels, notamment lies aux CC; soutenir le développement économique durable et inclusif
  - priorité du PNUD Djibouti pour améliorer l'accès a l'eau
  - le projet répond aux priorités stratégiques du FEM pour l'adaptation aux CC

2. Conception du projet

➢ *Cadre logique*

- **Dans sa conception, le projet répond bien aux problèmes de base, barrières et nouveaux 'challenges' liés aux CC**
- **Cependant plusieurs problèmes relevés dans le Cadre de Résultats:**
  - Trop grand nombre d'activités à mettre en œuvre (+ de 60)
  - Sites d'intervention éloignés et difficiles d'accès
  - Certaines activités ne sont pas alignées avec les indicateurs et ne permettent pas d'atteindre les cibles
  - La situation de base pour certains indicateurs ne reflète pas la réalité
- **Sous-estimation du coût de plusieurs interventions**
- **L'Evaluation Terminale apparaît comme la première analyse critique du projet depuis sa validation, pour lequel il n'y a pas eu d'étude de base; l'EMP ne fait ni recommandations, ni suggestions pour réajuster les cibles et indicateurs.**

3. Mise en œuvre

- ***Exécution et gestion du projet: aspects positifs***
- Equipe de projet a Djibouti réduite mais dynamique et engagée: la coordinatrice et l'assistant financier se partagent les rôles et responsabilités (missions terrain, finance, etc.) de façon efficace
- Montée en compétences de l'équipe de projet
- Efforts de coordination avec les partenaires sectoriels et autres projets de la DEDD
- Approche participative appliquée, avec consultations des communautés sur les sites bénéficiaires
- Partenaires de mise en œuvre (ONG EVA et GPAA) bien implantés dans leur région: bénéficient de la confiance de la population et d'une bonne connaissance du contexte
- Bon engagement des communautés locales dans la mise en œuvre (appel aux jeunes, travail contre salaire)
- Appui stratégique du RTA

3. Mise en œuvre

- **L'organigramme de gestion du projet est réduit, la gestion du projet est donc économe.**
- **Cependant, plusieurs limites à l' efficacité de la mise en œuvre sont notées :**
  - L' expérience limitée des membres de l'UGP (premier projet à gérer) … qui a pu être compensée en partie par la présence d'un pool d'experts techniques (hydrologue, agronome, socio-économiste) partagé avec un autre projet
  - Appui technique limité à l'UGP, que ce soit de la part de la DEDD, ou du PNUD (pas de CTA)
  - Pas d'accès aux formations PNUD pour l'UGP
  - Des lenteurs administratives propres au PNUD et au gouvernement djiboutien qui induisent des retards de paiements et de mise en œuvre

3. Mise en œuvre

- Le PF d'Adaillou n'était présent qu'a temps partiel sur le terrain, dès lors le suivi des sites plus éloignés n'a pas été complet
- Absence du PF d'Ali Sabieh sur les derniers mois du projet (pas au courant de la pépinière détruite)
- Echange d'information limité entre l'UGP a Djibouti et les PF régionaux (pas d'accès au prodoc/ cadre logique)
- Documents de projet pas traduits en français
- Implication limitée des autorités régionales d'Ali Sabieh: pas de vision globale du projet, pas de stratégie de reprise en main des interventions (attention, le président du CR est nouveau)
- Peu de visites de terrain et suivi du projet par l'équipe PNUD

3. Mise en œuvre

- Absence d' études pédologiques et hydrologiques pour déterminer le choix de l'emplacement des citernes → au moins 5 ne fonctionnent pas/ sont hors d'usage
- Choix des entreprises de construction: certaines n'ont pas effectué leur travail correctement
- Engagement limité de la part de certains partenaires de mise en œuvre même dans le gouvernement: Météo Djibouti ne souhaite pas reprendre en main les équipements météo sans contrepartie financière; le Bureau National de la Statistique ne veut pas fournir un soutien technique sans contrepartie financière.
- Prise en compte réduite des impacts des CC dans certaines activités du projet: par exemple, certains ouvrages de protection mal dimensionnés pour résister aux crues (en 2017 plusieurs ouvrages emportés; pépinière détruite; puits presque ensevelis)

3. Mise en œuvre

- **Suivi et évaluation**
- Pas de stratégie de S&E
- Pas de suivi travaux de construction comme les citernes semi-enterrées
- EMP de moindre qualité, sans réelles recommandations notamment en termes de révisions des cibles et indicateurs du projet pas atteignables
- Limite de la TE:
  - Arrive tardivement (malgré la recommandation du RTA dans le PIR 2019) alors que l' équipe de projet n'est plus payée
  - Malgré un grand nombre de sites visités et personnes rencontrées, certains sites comme Assa Guaila n'ont pas été visités
  - Pas de prise de rendez-vous en avance: communautés pas informées de notre venue, CR absent de Tadjourah
  - Temps courts pour conduire la TE afin de respecter les délais de soumission → mission courte mais beaucoup de rencontres possibles

4. Résultats

- **Cibles, indicateurs et activités:**
- De nombreuses cibles, indicateurs et même données de base n'étaient pas réalistes. L'absence de révision des cibles et indicateurs, à travers une étude de base et/ou l'EMP, est regrettable.
- Des sites très éloignés les uns des autres et difficilement atteignables limitent la possibilité d'un suivi efficace, et augmentent les coûts de mise en œuvre.
- Certaines activités du projet n'ont pas été mises en œuvre, sans qu'une justification claire soit fournie.
- Une activité (jardin éducatif) a été ajoutée sans qu'elle figure dans le prodoc, et sans qu'elle s'inscrive dans logique du projet. En outre, cette activité n'est pas achevée.

Toutefois, au vu des ressources limitées du projet, celui-ci a atteint des résultats significatifs par rapport à son objectif principal: réduire la vulnérabilité des populations rurales, en particulier en améliorant l'accès a l'eau et aux formations agricoles/maraichage

4. Résultats

- **Durabilité**
- Le CNCC semble bien réactivé et fait l'objet d'un soutien continu à travers d'autres projets, notamment des formations dans le cadre du GCF Readiness Programme
- La stratégie nationale sur les CC a été adoptée par le gouvernement; un plan d'action pour sa mise en œuvre va être développé
- Les formations des populations locales sur les gabions et l'agriculture ont permis de revitaliser le milieu rural, diversifier les activités et améliorer les revenus dans les zone cibles

4. Résultats

Cependant:

- Pas de stratégie de sortie opérationnelle à ce stade
- Appropriation peu claire des installations du projet par les partenaires de mise en œuvre, les autorités locales et les populations (pépinière, atelier gabion, etc.) => durabilité incertaine
- Certaines infrastructures sont déjà détruites, sans responsabilité établie pour leur réparation (seuils, digues, pépinière, citernes enterrées, stations météo)
- Risque de dommages, voir disparition, de certaines installations, même à court terme: puits, seuils, etc.
- Coopératives ont besoin d'appui pour la gestion financière, afin d'assurer la durabilité des péspinières et des ateliers de gabion

5. Recommandations préliminaires

- **Avant la clôture du projet:**
- Assurer la réparation des infrastructures endommagées ou détruites avec l'appui des partenaires adéquats
- Clarifier la responsabilité du suivi pour les activités toujours en cours comme la connexion du forage aux bornes-fontaine et le jardin éducatif afin d'assurer un travail de qualité
- Reprise en main par la DEDD des activités liées au reboisement (y compris pépinières)
- Donner les capacités aux partenaires locaux de reprendre en main l'atelier de gabions (appui technique, renforcement des coopératives) – éventuellement avec l'appui des autorités régionales, qui sont à consulter pour le développement de la stratégie de sortie

5. Recommandations préliminaires

- **Pour d'autres projets:**
- Mieux prendre en compte les CC dans la conception technique/faisabilité des activités
- Clarifier les conditions de partenariat avec les acteurs locaux dès le départ pour éviter de générer incompréhensions et frustrations
- Traduire et partager tous les documents relatifs au projet avec les acteurs de mise en œuvre
- Appuyer l'effort de décentralisation de Djibouti en incluant de façon systématique les autorités locales dans le montage des projets, la prise de décision et la stratégie de sorte, notamment par des visites de courtoisie régulières.
- S'assurer d'avoir des experts adéquats pour suivre les travaux de construction
- Limiter la dispersion des sites et activités (ex: nombre de bénéficiaires réalistes)
- Apporter un appui technique adéquat a l'UGP (ex: via conseillers techniques, CTA, équipe PNUD)

6. Prochaines étapes

- Poursuite de l'analyse des documents et livrables du projet
- **31 janvier: soumission de la première version du rapport**
- **20 février: remise du rapport final**

2. Photographs of key highlights from the field visits

Picture 1. The micro-dam built in the wadi upstream of Assamo has been damaged from floods, and need to be maintained.

Picture 2. View from the upstream side of the Assamo micro-dam. The area where people are standing used to be 2 meters below the level of the micro-dam. Three years after its construction, sand and rocks carried by wadi waters filled this space, and the upstream wadi bed is now level with the micro-dam. Unless the height of the micro-dam is raised by adding another layer of gabions, it will soon be overflown by sand and rocks.

Pictures 3a & 3b. The two micro-dams built in Adailou are in good shape, and already proved useful to foster aquifer recharge.

Pictures 4a & 4b. Two wells in the Adailou area. Located in or just next to the wadi beds, these wells are vulnerable to floods, that can damage them and pollute their water. The triangular structure on Picture 4a was built to protect this particular well from floods. Several wells were thus protected, each time taking the topography of the wadi bed into account to design the protections. Most existing wells were also further excavated.


Pictures 5a & 5b. Nurseries were established in both Adailou and Assamo. While the Adailou nursery (5a) is still in good shape, the Assamo nursery was damaged by the sun and strong winds in July-August 2019. Exit strategies to capitalise on both nurseries and new capacities acquired by the nursery teams should be designed.


Picture 6 (left below). A borehole was drilled near Adailou, and equipped with a solar-powered pump. It is not yet to connected to standposts, and has not started to benefit households yet. The contracts for the establishment of standposts have been signed and construction should happen soonest. Responsibility for the supervision of this work is not clear though, as the PMU has been dissolved since 31 December 2019.
Picture 7 (right below). Gabion workshops were built in Adailou and Assamo (pictured). Training was provided by young local community members to produce gabions, and these people were then paid by the project to build the water protection infrastructures. The workshop buildings were handed over to EVA and GPAA, respectively. Excess material to build gabions was procured, so that trained community members can produce additional gabions for the maintenance of infrastructures established by the project, or the creation of new ones.




Picture 8 (left below). Ten market gardens were set up by the project in Adailou[35]. A well and a 100 m^3 reservoir were established or rehabilitated in each of these 2,500 m^2 gardens. Seedlings were given and agricultural training was provided. Species grown include fodder species, fruit trees (lemon trees, guava trees), pepper, date palm trees, onions, beans and maize.
Picture 9 (right below). One of the rain gauges established in Adailou. The battery of this particular gauge was dead when the evaluators visited. AWSs are equipped for tele-transmission, but the phone network coverage does not allow this functionality. Data thus needs to be retrieved monthly directly at the station, which is currently not done (including in Assamo).

[35] And fencing material was provided to set up 30 additional gardens.

ANNEX 5: LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The documents below were consulted to conduct the Terminal Evaluation.
Project documents:

- GEF Project Information Form (PIF), Project Document and CEO Endorsement Request;
- Implementing/executing partner arrangements;
- Midterm evaluation (MTE);
- Annual Project Implementation Reports (PIR);
- Project budget, broken out by outcomes, outputs and activities;
- Audits: 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018
- Project Steering Committee reports (March & December 2018, December 2019)
- Environmental & Social Impact assessment (January 2019)
- National Climate Change Strategy
- Annual project reports (2015, 2016, 2017, 2018)
- Compagnie D'Aménagement des Coteaux de Gascogne. January 2017. Bassin versant de l'oued de Weima. Diagnostic hydraulique et structurel des sites d'Adaylou, Abahloïta et Guemellou.
- Agricultural consultant reports August 2016, January 2017, February 2017 & September 2016
- Project deliverables (studies, reports etc.)

- UNDP documents:
  - UNDP strategic plan 2018-2021
  - Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF)
  - Country Programme Document (CPD)
  - Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP)
- GEF document: GEF focal area strategic program objectives
- National document: Vision Djibouti 2035

ANNEX 6: EVALUATION QUESTION MATRIX

Evaluation questions	Indicators	Information source	Data collection method
Relevance: How does the project relate to the main objectives of the GEF focal area, and to the environment and development priorities at the local, regional and national levels?			
1. To what extent is the project aligned with UNDP and the GEF's strategic priorities?	• Level of alignment between the project and UNDP and the GEF's strategic priorities	• Prodoc and project planning documents • UNDP strategic plan 2018-2021 • Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) • Country Programme Document (CPD) • Country Programme Action Plan (CPAP) • GEF Strategic Priorities • UNDP staff, local executing team	• Desk review • Interviews
2. To what extent is the project responding to the national and sub-national environmental needs and priorities?	• Level of alignment between the project and national or sub-national development plans, poverty reduction strategies, climate change strategies and other environmental agreements. • Level of alignment between the project and local needs and priorities • Level of complementarity between the project and other existing initiatives • Evidence coordination between relevant ongoing initiatives • Number and type of cofinancing partners and amount of cofinancing provided	• Prodoc and project planning documents • National and sub-national development plans, poverty reduction strategies, climate change strategies, other environmental agreements • Government partners • UNDP staff • Local executing team	• Desk review • Interviews
Effectiveness: To what extent have the expected outcomes and objectives of the project been achieved?			
1. *Achievement of outputs:* Is the project successfully delivering its outputs and achieving targets as per the prodoc?	• Number and type of outputs delivered against the logframe' s final targets • Timeliness of output delivery against the work plan • Quality of outputs delivered • Perceived level of success of on the ground intervention so far and potential gaps	• Project planning documents (quarterly and annual work plans, as relevant) • Progress reports and monitoring reports • UNDP staff • Project Management Unit (PMU) • Local executing partners • Local stakeholders	• Desk review • Interviews • Field visit

Evaluation questions	Indicators	Information source	Data collection method
	• Existence and quality of studies and strategy conducted through the project and type of audience and way of dissemination • Number and type of awareness-raising activities conducted and type of audience	• Direct observation	
2. *Achievement of direct outcomes:* Are the outputs contributing to the achievement of project's outcomes?	• Number and extent of achievement of milestones toward meeting direct outcome indicators • Evidence of contribution of the project to direct outcomes • Communities' (including women's) perceived benefits from the project so far	• Monitoring and reporting documents (quarterly and annual work plans) • PMU, UNDP manager, RTA • Local executing partners • Local stakeholders • Government stakeholders, technical staff • Direct observation • PSC minutes	• Desk review • Interviews • Field visit
Efficiency: Was the project implemented efficiently, in-line with international and national norms and standards?			
1. To what extent are the outputs being achieved in a cost-effective manner?	• Level of alignment between planned and incurred implementation costs and nature of divergences • Evidence of use of financially sound practices for project execution and management	• Financial reporting/ auditing documents (quarterly, annual reports) • UNDP manager and RTA	• Desk review • Interviews
2. Are the timing and sequence of activities contributing to or hindering efficiency?	• Timing and sequence of outputs against work plan • Nature and total delays (in months) generated by implementation bottlenecks	• Project planning and reporting documents • Financial reporting/ auditing documents (quarterly, annual reports) for this project and for other similar projects • UNDP manager and RTA	• Desk review • Interviews
3. How is the project enhancing its cost- and time-efficiency? Is efficiency likely to change before the end of the project?	• Number and nature of measures implemented to enhance cost- and time-effectiveness • Likelihood and effect of factors likely to enhance or hinder efficiency	• Project planning and reporting documents • UNDP manager and RTA	• Desk review • Interviews
4. Is the rate of disbursement consistent with the work plan, the length of implementation to date and the outputs delivered?	• Budget execution per year, component and output, against total budget	• Monitoring and reporting documents (quarterly, annual reports)	• Interviews • Desk review

Evaluation questions	Indicators	Information source	Data collection method
		• UNDP manager, Financial Officer and RTA • GEF/UNDP reporting requirements	
5. Does the project comply with financial reporting and/or auditing requirements/ schedule, including quality and timeliness of reports?	• Proportion and types of financial reporting and/or auditing materials submitted a) correctly and b) on time • Quality of financial reporting/auditing materials	• Financial reporting/ auditing documents (quarterly, annual reports) • UNDP manager, Financial Officer and RTA • GEF/UNDP reporting requirements	• Interviews • Desk review
6. Quality of project implementation and execution: Have the IA and EA, respectively, placed sufficient focus on: a. Achieving project outcomes? b. Supervision?	• Use of Results-Based Management tools, evidence of regular reporting by Executing Agency (EA) • Perceptions of quality of supervision of Implementing Agency (IA) and EA, PMU and Project Steering Committee (PSC) respectively • Difference in actual and planned timetable for project execution of activities	• Local implementing partners • Government stakeholders • Project team members • PMU, UNDP manager, and RTA • Reporting documents • PSC and minutes	• Desk review • Interviews • Field Visit
7. Quality of project implementation and execution: Have the IA management team and EA project team respectively provided quality and timely project management and backstopping?	• Perceived leadership of IA and EA towards achieving project outcomes • Perceived effectiveness of IA and EA in managing team structures and maintaining productive partner relationships, communication and collaboration • Extent of use of risk management tools by IA and EA, respectively • Perceived effectiveness of problem-solving methods • Perceived timeliness and quality of IA management response to EA project team members' inquiries, needs • PSC and other stakeholder perceptions of quality of PMU and oversight by IA	• Local implementing partners • Government stakeholders • Project team members • PMU, UNDP manager, and RTA • Reporting documents • PSC and minutes	• Desk Review • Interviews • Field Visit

Evaluation questions	Indicators	Information source	Data collection method
	• EA and other stakeholder perceptions of technical inputs and feedback from IA and RTA • Evidence of re-adjustment of project strategy in response to internal reviews or management findings		
8. Stakeholder participation and cooperation: Are the stakeholder communication and consultation mechanisms effective and inclusive of differentiated groups?	• Number and type of stakeholder engagement activities at each stage of the project • Evidence of participation from a representative range of stakeholder groups, including differentiated groups • Proportion of male/female implementing partners, and participants of workshops, trainings or knowledge exchange • Evidence that issues and feedback provided by stakeholders were taken into consideration in project implementation OR *Extent of beneficiary needs integrated into project design (appropriateness of strategies chosen, site selection, degree of vulnerability of targeted HHs, etc.)*	• Workshop/planning meeting minutes and action items, including PSC • Local implementing partners • Community members, groups • Government stakeholders, technical staff • Other local stakeholder groups (non-government) • PMU, UNDP manager, and/or RTA	• Desk review • Interviews • Field visit
Sustainability: To what extent are there financial, institutional, social-economic, and/or environmental risks to sustaining long-term project results?			
1. Has the project designed and implemented an appropriate exit strategy and measures to mitigate risks to sustainability?	• Existence and quality of a plan to manage financial, socio-economic, institutional, governance and environmental risks • Existence and quality of an exit strategy • Degree of coherence between actions taken during implementation to avert sustainability risks and prepare project exit, and intended plan	• Project planning documents • PMU, UNDP manager, and/or RTA • Local implementation partners • Project monitoring and reporting docs/data (quarterly and annual reports) • Government stakeholders, technical staff	• Interviews • Desk review • Field visit
2. What factors are in place to enable or hinder the persistence of achieved direct outcomes?	• Number and type of organizational arrangements that support or hinder the continuation of project activities or results (private or public sector)	• Project planning documents • PMU, UNDP manager, and/or RTA • Local implementation partners	• Interviews • Desk review • Field visit

Evaluation questions	Indicators	Information source	Data collection method
	• Type of political and social conditions affecting the sustainability of direct outcomes • Types and intensity of bio-physical conditions affecting the sustainability of direct outcomes • Level of declared willingness among stakeholders to take the project achievements forward • Level of dependence of achievements on future funding for their sustainability and likely availability of such resources	• Local stakeholders (workshop participants, community members, etc.) • Project monitoring and reporting docs/data (quarterly and annual reports) • Government stakeholders, technical staff	
3. To what extent is replication or upscaling of project activities likely?	• Existence and type of contextual factors supporting or hindering replication/upscaling • Examples of actions undertaken by the project to favour upscaling and replication	• Project planning documents • PMU, UNDP manager, and/or RTA • Local implementation partners • Government stakeholders, technical staff	• Interviews • Desk review • Field visit
Impact: Are there indications that the project has contributed to, or enabled progress toward, reduced environmental stress and/or improved ecological status?			
1. *Likelihood of impact (where appropriate and feasible):* Is the project progressing toward achievement of intended impacts?	• Number and extent of achievement of milestones towards meeting impact indicators • Evidence and extent of barriers or enabling conditions toward achievement of impact indicators	• Monitoring and reporting documents (quarterly and annual work plans) • PMU, UNDP manager, and/or RTA • Local implementing partners • Local stakeholders • Government stakeholders • Technical staff • Direct observation • PSC minutes	• Desk review • Interviews • Field visit
2. *Is the project likely to generate adverse environmental, social and economic effects?*	• Nature and likelihood of adverse environmental, social and economic effects from the project	• Environmental & Social Safeguards (ESS) report • Beneficiaries • Local partners	• Desk review • Interviews • Field visit
Other evaluation categories (as relevant)			
1. How is risk and risk mitigation being managed?	• Completeness of risk identification and assumptions during project planning and design	• Project documents • UNDP, project team, and relevant stakeholders	• Desk review • Interviews

Evaluation questions	Indicators	Information source	Data collection method
	• Quality of existing information systems in place to identify emerging risks and other issues • Quality of risk mitigations strategies developed and followed		
2. *Stakeholder participation and cooperation*: To what extent were effective partnerships arrangements established for implementation of the project with relevant stakeholders involved in the country/region?	• Number and types of partnerships developed between project and local bodies/organisations • Extent and quality of interaction/ exchange between project implementers and local partners	• Meetings/workshop minutes (steering committee) • Government partners and technical staff • Local implementing partners • Communities/ potential beneficiaries • PMU, UNDP manager, and/or RTA • PSC and minutes	• Desk review • Interviews • Field visit
3. *Responsiveness to human rights and gender equity*: To what extent has the project applied the UN Human rights-based approach, the UN Declaration on the rights of Indigenous People and UNDP's Gender Equality Strategy 2018-2021 and UNDP's Social and Environmental Standards described in the Programming and Operations Policies and Procedures for Programme and Project Management.	• Level of alignment between project design and implementation and guiding documents.	• Planning documents • Monitoring and reporting documents • PMU, UNDP manager and/or RTA	• Desk review • Interviews • Field visit
4. *Responsiveness to human rights and gender equity*: To what extent have the project design, implementation and monitoring taken into account gender inequalities and differentiation?	• Number and quality of measures in project design, implementation and monitoring, respectively, that address: o Possible gender inequalities in access to and control over natural resources; o Specific inequalities in access to and control over natural resources; o The role of women in mitigating or adapting to environmental changes, and engaging in environmental protection and rehabilitation	• Planning documents • Monitoring and reporting documents • PMU, UNDP manager and/or RTA • Local communities • Local implementing partners	• Desk review • Interviews • Field visit

	Evaluation questions	Indicators	Information source	Data collection method
		• Level of perceived consideration of gender inequalities in the project design, implementation and monitoring • Number of the policies, plans frameworks and processes supported by the project that incorporate gender dimensions		
	5. *Country ownership and driven-ness*: Is the level of involvement of government/ public sector officials sufficient to ensure ownership over project outputs and outcomes and representation of all gender and marginalised groups?	• Number and types of representatives from government and public sector agencies present at workshops and involved in implementation (including PSC) • Number and types of regulations, policies or other government initiatives (existing, newly enacted, or changed) that support project outputs and outcomes • Proportion of a) representatives; b) government initiatives that represent the needs and interests of gender and marginalized groups.	• Government partners • Local implementing partners • Project monitoring and reporting information (workshop summaries, attendance lists, action items etc.) • PMU and PSC	• Desk review • Interviews • Field visit
	6. *Communication and public awareness*: Do the project effectively communicate lessons and experience with project partners and interested groups?	• Number and quality of knowledge sharing mechanisms with project partners and interested groups • Perceived awareness by partners and interested groups about project lessons, including by gender and marginalized groups • Evidence of existence and use of feedback channels by partners and interested groups	• Government partners • Local implementing partners • Project monitoring and reporting information (workshop summaries, attendance lists, action items etc.) • PMU and PSC	• Desk review • Interviews • Field visit
	7. *Communication and public awareness*: Has the project implemented appropriate outreach and public awareness campaigns?	• Number and quality of public awareness activities undertaken • Number and type of public reached • Changes in public awareness as a result of outreach/ communication by project	• Local implementing partners • Community members, groups • Government stakeholders, technical staff • Other local stakeholder groups (non-government) • PMU, UNDP manager, and/or RTA • Workshop/planning meeting minutes and action items, including PSC	• Desk review • Interviews • Field visit

Evaluation questions	Indicators	Information source	Data collection method
8. *Communication and public awareness:* (If appropriate,) Is the knowledge sharing platform likely to be sustained beyond the project implementation?	• Level of dependence of platform on project's institutional and financial arrangements • Level of socio-political support for the platform	• Government partners • Local implementing partners • Project monitoring and reporting information (workshop summaries, attendance lists, action items etc.) • PMU and PSC	• Desk review • Interviews • Field visit

ANNEX 7: QUESTIONNAIRE USED AND SUMMARY OF RESULTS

The questionnaire below was used with some flexibility depending on the identify and role of the interviewees, as well as the context of the interviews. Response notes in the table were anonymised, and reflect the diversity of information which the evaluators triangulated with their own assessment of the TE criteria as well as a critical analysis of project documents and deliverables.

Table 13. Summary of responses to interview questions.

	Interview questions		Anonymised summary of responses
1	**Satisfaction**		
	1.1	What have been the key achievements; i.e. what would not have happened, or happened as quickly without the project?	- the National Climate Change Committee (NCCC) has been revitalised through the project: DEDD has identified focal points within each relevant ministry to join the committee. A decree to formally institutionalise the NCCC has been prepared and ready to be signed; - the National Climate Change Strategy has been adopted by the government; at this stage, DEDD is planning to develop an action plan to operationalise it; - in Adailou, the project had several good impacts; for example, the gabion walls set up help much with water filtration and reduce notably floods in the area; there were also 3 large fallow areas which were protected by 'eco-guards' during the project implementation; - in Adailou, a gabion workshop has been built by the project, equipment bought, and community members have been trained to build the gabion cage. It is planned that NGO Eva will use the center as its own office and continue the construction of gabion cage with local population, providing support; - Adailou gabion wall and underground water tanks: *t*he wall protects the population against floods and facilitate water infiltration into the wells and underground water tank set up by the project; - Adailou: the project has rehabilitated traditional wells; thanks to the rehabilitation, now the wells can provide water for the whole year; - Assamo: the gabion wall set up by the project are effective to protect against floods and increase water filtration in the wells; the wells rehabilitated by the project provide water all year round.

	1.2	To what extent is the project's work aligned with key priorities of your organisation?	- the project is seen as a priority as it tackles water issues in Djibouti which is crucial; - DEDD did not want to create the Fund originally; - project full aligned with the association's priorities.
	1.3	What are areas in which the project could do better in terms of quality of interactions, processes that the project uses, technical work or knowledge sharing? Please give examples.	- in Dora site, all the underground water tanks have failed because they were damages by floods. There was no feasibility or scientific analysis to support the site choice for the tanks; moreover, the construction company did a poor job.
	1.4	Please comment on how well the project is addressing or incorporating into its work emerging priorities, such as the renewed emphasis on gender equality, sustainability or country ownership?	- Women benefit from improvement of wells and market gardens - the activities removed – like aviculture – were due to the DEDD's decision to establish the garden.
	1.5	What were the main difficulties / challenges faced during the project?	- difficulties for the FP to communicate with the project team in Djibouti; - procurement delays have perverse effects on quality: the reason why the contract value was too low to perform a good job is because, in Djibouti, contract above DJF5,000,000 must be discussed and decided in the 'commission de passation de marche'. The process is long so to avoid it, the DEDD made the contract value lower; - some of the gabion walls were destroyed and the project had to rebuild them, which is why money ran out for some activities. The fact that the construction was not resilient to floods is because companies do not use climate change projections in their design; they have not changes how they design construction work for decades although it is not adapted to the current context anymore; - the NMA does not want to take over the weather equipment because they do not have the capacity to come collect the data from the stations in situ; the expectation was that data could be set out to Djibouti-City; however, there is no connection/mobile network to enable that; - all Directions, which are supposed to take over project activities, always lack the financial resources to do so. This is the case of the NMA but also of the water direction: they would not have the resources to fix the wells or boreholes that fall within they responsibility after a project; - the project has built a tree nursery; however, it starts to degrade already. Moreover, as the project ended, the nursery man and his assistant are not employed anymore, hence no one is currently working in the nursery. Eva NGO could take over the tree nursery activities providing support, including setting up a solar pump (to replace petrol generator), rehabilitating the nursery and providing salary for the nursery man or his assistant.

2	**Collaboration and partnering**		
	2.1	Is the project doing enough to partner with other relevant organisations, including local organisations? In what ways are they working well? Are any important connections not being made, and if this is the case, how can they improve?	- good alignment with EVA's work. EVA has a lot of experience working with local agropastoral communities in the region. The ONG has been established for more than 20 years, is now working on climate change resilience interventions and is well known by the local population. Sensitisation to climate resilient practices has already been conducted in the region by this NGO; - the Regional Council has a limited role in the project: they are not involved in the conception and implementation. RC president does not know the regional project focal point; - Assamo: the regional FP has not come to project site since early 2019; in case of problem, the cooperative would call the PMU in Djibouti because there was no contact point in the region; - the project team consulted all local communities in order to determine best activities and their location on each project site; local young people were hired to implement some of the project activities to earn an income. Therefore, the project was highly participative; - the project chose to work with regional focal point from the regions and with good understanding of the communities and problems; - the project also worked with existing cooperatives which is why no training was provided e.g. for marketing and financial management; - there have been sessions held with the PM of the LDCF-3 project to discuss project sites and make sure the project was not duplicating any interventions of the MAEP, but rather complement them or are established in different sites. - the Agriculture Directory has regional technical experts to support population and they can serve as contact points if a problem occurs with some equipment like water pump; - it was good to work with a local NGO like EVA; however, it would have been better to rather involve local cooperatives like it was done in Assamo because then they increase their capacity and can take over project activities; - despite the project being implemented under the NIM modality, UNDP will ensure the follow up of the remaining/ongoing project activities in particular the water adduction for the borehole;- limited communication within MHUE; some decisions would be taken and signed without the PMU being consulted/informed;

			- the lack of engagement of other institutions – e.g. NMA or Water Direction – to take over equipment is because these directions are not at all involved in project implementation. If NMA is to take over weather equipment, they should be informed and involved in the process of setting up and operationalize this equipment during the project's lifetime. If they are required to take over once the project is finished only, they will refuse.
3	**Knowledge management and capacity building**		
	3.1	How are the project's products shared among partners and among relevant organisations? Are lessons learned captured, compiled and shared? Are project results shared and used to facilitate replication of best practices? How could this process be improved?	- not at all aware of the situation of the underground water tanks and the damages caused by floods and bad construction work;- never seen the prodoc and indicators/targets; - it is not appropriate to share the full prodoc with the regional focal point because it would raise expectation and conflicts.
	3.2	Is the project addressing capacity building needs of the beneficiary community organisations (e.g. CBOs and cooperatives, relevant line ministries, PES legal experts) and local governmental institutions? Please elaborate.	- Assamo: the cooperative has never received trainings on financial management; - aviculture and apiculture activities were removed because there was no more budget for that. Moreover, these activities would have started too late in project implementation to be successful; and aviculture does not work too well in the region, people have reported that the benefits are not as good as they hoped; - NCCC members have received trainings and meet on a regular basis on climate change related issues, including to review proposal for the GCF.
4	**Future direction**		
	4.1	What are the strengths and weaknesses of this project and what would you like to see changed in future project designs?	- worry about the continuation of project activities now that the project has ended: several interventions – in particular infrastructure but also ecosystem restauration – have already stopped and are already starting to degrade. The lack of exit strategy for the project and action plan to operationalize it is worrisome; - Adailou: the project implemented natural regeneration on the fallow areas; no assisted regeneration was implemented; reforestation was only done on a very limited scale – a few trees on each fallow area – due to lack of support; - Adailou: the only reforestation done on the 3 fallow areas are respectively, 11, 6 and 11 trees replanted; - need to involve local authorities more to ensure project sustainability. For example, the project management unit should be located within the

			project region and not in Djibouti. Local actors should also be better involved in the conception and implementation; - the project, in its design, includes a large number of activities in sites which are far away from each other and with difficult access. Hence the targets were hardly reachable; - synergies with implementation partners and with other projects was challenging because of their own agenda and targets, however a strategy to work on different sites and to capitalise on available expertise was implemented; - a technical pool of experts was available to support the PMU to implement technical interventions in agriculture and hydrology at the beginning of the project, this was very useful; - the project sites are located far away from each other; this was increased by the fact that UNDP requested to add project sites in Ali Sabieh; - the PMU is small, because the budget does not allow for more staff members. It is not possible for the project to get experienced project manager because of the salary the project can pay; - it is true that some of the sites in Adailou are remote; however, it is important to help the people living there because they are more vulnerable. The approach is to pick remote sites where there are no/few projects and start something there; then, often other projects follow up.
	4.2	What are the technical gaps or emerging priorities that need to be addressed?	- the NCCC still needs a financial mechanism to be fully operational but supports are received from other projects in terms of trainings – including through the NAP process and GCF Readiness programme – with regards to the Fund, a consultant is still working on its strategy, which has not yet been presented to DEDD; - to ensure the duration and protection of the fallow area until the trees are big enough to sustain animals, it will be necessary to pay new eco-guards; - Adailou: some of the underground water tanks have not received any water yet because of lack of rain since their establishment. Because the tanks were not filled up with water when built, they start to break. At least 5 of the tanks will need to be rehabilitated; - Adailou: one rain gauge has been established in Adailou; the hydrologist expert used to come and collect the data to produce reports on precipitations in the area. However, the rain gauges are not operationalized anymore as the project ended;

			- the borehole of Adoyla is complete; however, the agro-pastoral plot which was supposed to be built by the project and irrigated with the borehole water was cancelled. Instead the project plans to install water pipes and fountain to use the water for animals. At the moment, there is no use of the borehole water, which can be extracted with solar pump; - worry that as the project is finished, the gabion workshop and tree nursery will fall into pieces as there is no exit plan in place; - Assamo: the project has built a gabion workshop, equipment and training were provided. The cooperative will take over as lots of material are still available to build gabion wall; however, they still need technical support to be efficient; - Assamo: the tree nursery set up by the project is entirely destroyed; this happened during summer 2019; the project only set up the nursery (no payment for nursery assistant etc.); - there is a need to better collaborate with partner organisations/institutions during project implementation to ensure take over.

ANNEX 8: EVALUATION CONSULTANT AGREEMENT FORM

Evaluators:

1. Must present information that is complete and fair in its assessment of strengths and weaknesses so that decisions or actions taken are well founded.
2. Must disclose the full set of evaluation findings along with information on their limitations and have this accessible to all affected by the evaluation with expressed legal rights to receive results.
3. Should protect the anonymity and confidentiality of individual informants. They should provide maximum notice, minimize demands on time, and respect people's right not to engage. Evaluators must respect people's right to provide information in confidence, and must ensure that sensitive information cannot be traced to its source. Evaluators are not expected to evaluate individuals, and must balance an evaluation of management functions with this general principle.
4. Sometimes uncover evidence of wrongdoing while conducting evaluations. Such cases must be reported discreetly to the appropriate investigative body. Evaluators should consult with other relevant oversight entities when there is any doubt about if and how issues should be reported.
5. Should be sensitive to beliefs, manners and customs and act with integrity and honesty in their relations with all stakeholders. In line with the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, evaluators must be sensitive to and address issues of discrimination and gender equality. They should avoid offending the dignity and self-respect of those persons with whom they come in contact in the course of the evaluation. Knowing that evaluation might negatively affect the interests of some stakeholders, evaluators should conduct the evaluation and communicate its purpose and results in a way that clearly respects the stakeholders'dignity and self-worth.
6. Are responsible for their performance and their product(s). They are responsible for the clear, accurate and fair written and/or oral presentation of study imitations, findings and recommendations.
7. Should reflect sound accounting procedures and be prudent in using the resources of the evaluation.

Evaluation Consultant Agreement Form[36]

Agreement to abide by the Code of Conduct for Evaluation in the UN System

Name of Consultant: __Dr Marie-Ange Baudoin

Name of Consultancy Organization (where relevant)**:** __N/A_____

I confirm that I have received and understood and will abide by the United Nations Code of Conduct for Evaluation.

Signed at Cape Town on 1 December 2019

Signature:

[36]www.unevaluation.org/unegcodeofconduct

ANNEX 9: PROPOSAL FOR TERMS OF REFERENCE OF FUTURE GROUPED PROCUREMENT OF WATER PUMPS

This proposal was prepared by the hydrologist consultant, and is reproduced here for future reference.

AIDE A LA REDACTION DES TERMES DE REFERENCE POUR L'ACHAT DE GROUPES MOTOPOMPES
A DESTINATION DES PROJETS ADAYLOU ET ASSAMO
16 10 2015, revu 23 10 2015

Les groupes motopompes équipant les puits d'Adaylou et Assamo proviennent de différents bailleurs de fonds, de différents pays et de différentes marques.

Certains sont en panne, peut' être pour un détail, mais il n'y a personne sur Djibouti pour assurer la maintenance et les réparations de certaines marques.

Il s'agit de groupes de surface ou de groupes immergés, l'équipement solaire prenant à juste titre de plus en plus de place. Les débits sont compris entre 0,1 m3/h (1,7l/min) et 5 m3/h (83l/min).

Il conviendrait pour les prochaines consultations d'achat de matériel de **choisir (par consultation restreinte ou appel d'offres) un fournisseur unique et d'imposer à ce fournisseur l'obligation d'un représentant à Djibouti, avec atelier d'installation, stock de matériel et de pièces de rechange, maintenance et réparation, avec évidemment une équipe compétente.**

Les groupes (généralement des pompes immergées avec panneaux solaires, livrés et installés) doivent être adaptés aux possibilités réelles du puits, et non sur-dimensionnés comme cela a été souvent observé. Le choix de la puissance et de la hauteur manométrique du groupe doivent être déterminés après réalisation d'essais de pompage sur au moins une journée.

Le sur-équipement d'un puits entraîne d'abord un sur-coût d'équipement, ensuite une destruction rapide du puits par entraînement des particules fines du terrain qui l'entourent.

Les besoins ne sont pas négligeables : entre 20 et 50 groupes dans un premier temps seulement pour Adaylou et Assamo. D'autres projets pourraient éventuellement être associés pour augmenter le nombre de groupes à fournir et rendre la consultation plus attractive.